http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi/The%20Middle%20East
/Iraq/The_Iraqi_Constitut.writeback
Wed, 24 Aug 2005
The Iraqi Constitution and US Exit Strategy
by Srdja Trifkovic
With only minutes to go before the deadline at midnight on Monday, Iraqi
leaders presented the country's parliament with a draft constitution and
announced that "democracy had triumphed." In reality no party has reason to
feel triumphant. The document is not ready because the three constituent
communities have not agreed on some of its key points. Iraq's parliament
has postponed its vote on the draft for three more days, the second such
postponement this month. The White House is keeping its fingers crossed
that a formula will be found to paper over the differences among its
putative Iraqi allies.
The latest extension is supposed to "keep the door open" for Sunni Muslims,
one-fifth of Iraq's population that used to run the country under Saddam
Hussein and for several centuries before him. The Sunnis, who inhabit
central Iraq which has no major oil wells, remain at loggerheads with
Shi'ites and Kurds on the key issue of federalism. They fear that the
country's decentralization, which would entail the creation of a southern
Shi'a-controlled entity on par with the Kurdish de facto autonomous zone in
the north, would leave them both powerless and penniless.
Shi'ites and Kurds have enough votes to impose their version of the
document, but they are also aware that the end of the insurgency may become
possible only if Sunni Muslims are engaged in the political process and
have a stake in the new order. Sunni Arabs boycotted parliamentary
elections last January and now have just over a dozen deputies in the
475-member National Assembly. When the Shi'ite coalition that holds a
majority in the Assembly established the Constitution Committee last April,
only two Sunni deputies were included. It is likely that the draft
constitution cannot be passed unless Shi'a promoters of full autonomy for
their southern regions accept a less ambitious formula instead, the one
that would entail a broad delegation of powers now centralized in Baghdad
to the regional or local level. That, analysts say, may address a chief
Sunni concern that setting up Shi'a as well as Kurdish autonomous regions
would leave Sunni areas economically disadvantaged.
Addressing the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Utah on August 22, President
Bush said he was confident that Iraqi negotiators would produce a
constitution "that reflects the values and traditions of the Iraqi people."
The problem is that those "values and traditions" include ethnic,
confessional and tribal loyalties that transcend any concept of "Iraq" as a
common Shia, Sunni and Kurdish state to which all three groups owe their
primary loyalties. "The United States supports political and economic
liberty in a unified Iraq," Mr. Bush declared at the U.N. in September
2002, six months before the war. He may have to rephrase "unified" with a
more nuanced formula.
Far more problematic for the United States is not the area of disagreement
among the drafters of Iraq's constitution, but a key point on which they
seem to agree: that Islam is to be the foundation for all laws, and that
any proposal that contradicts Islamic religious teachings will be removed
from the statute book in the new, democratic Iraq. "Islam is a main source
for legislation and it is not permitted to legislate anything that
conflicts with the fixed principles of the rules of Islam," the latest
draft says—and American commentators have been strangely oblivious to this
fact.
More alarmingly still, according to a Reuters report ("U.S. concedes ground
to Islamists on Iraqi law") these principles have been approved by American
diplomats in Baghdad. This has prompted a secular Kurdish politician to
complain that the Americans have sided with the Shi'ites: "It's shocking.
It doesn't fit American values. They have spent so much blood and money
here, only to back the creation of an Islamist state . . . I can't believe
that's what the Americans really want or what the American people want."
"Perhaps the Americans are negotiating to get a deal at any cost," he went
on, "but we will not accept a constitution at any cost."
Some Kurds, whose objectives are nationalist rather than religious,
complain that current language in Article 2 of the draft would subject
Iraqis to extreme interpretations of Islamic law and allow Islamic clerics
to serve on the high court that will interpret the constitution: "That
could subject marriage, divorce, inheritance and other civil matters to
religious law and could harm women's rights, according to the Kurdish
negotiators and some women's groups." But Sunni Arab negotiator Saleh
al-Mutlak confirmed that Americans have agreed to the principle that
parliament could pass no laws that "contradicted Islamic principles." "The
Americans agreed," he said, "but on one condition—that the principles of
democracy should be respected."
This is a remarkable development. It may reflect excessive eagerness in
Washington to maintain some momentum on the political front, at a time when
large areas of Iraq remain affected by an open-ended guerrilla insurgency.
Monthly Central Command estimates, according to which thousands of
insurgents have been killed or captured, may be correct, but the ability of
the resistance to attract new recruits and step up the violence remains
undiminished. Local U.S. military successes, such as the Fallujah operation
last fall, appear temporary and even meaningless in the absence of a broad
strategic design to end the war by political means. Making concessions that
would ensure a swift adoption of the Iraqi constitution may be seen as a
way out of the looming imbroglio.
Nevertheless, Washington's acceptance that Islam is to be the foundation of
Iraq's democracy is light years away from the concept of "spreading
democracy in the Middle East" that has been used as a justification for the
war in Iraq. The "principles of democracy" may be nominally respected and
used to establish an Allahocracy, just as Hitler had used those principles
in 1933 to destroy democracy. The basis of the social and legal order and
obligation in Islam is the Kuran XE "Kuran (Koran, Qu'ran)," the final and
perfect revelation of Allah XE "Allah"'s will that is to be obeyed by all
creation. Allah's divine sovereignty is irreconcilable with popular
sovereignty, which is the essence of democracy.
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY
The original Arab word for "kingdom" is mulk, from the Semitic root m-l-k
that is common to both Arabic and Hebrew; in Islamic terminology, it has
come to signify the realm in which only Allah XE "Allah" is its King, even
in the earthly domain. (To denote a kingdom in secular and political sense,
the Arabic language commonly uses another derived form, that is, mamlakah.)
Islam therefore sees Muslims as worshippers and slaves of Allah (ibaad
Allah). The Islamic law, the Shari'a, is therefore not a supplement to the
"secular" legal code, it is the only such code and the only basis of
obligation, because a Muslim's only true allegiance is to Allah, and to
Muhammad XE "Muhammad (Mohamed)": "He who obeys the Messenger, obeys
Allah." (Kuran, 4:8)
No mere human entity has the authority to enact laws: Allah XE "Allah"'s
earthly plenipotentiary—khalif—merely enforces the law in this world, in
accordance with Muhammad XE "Muhammad (Mohamed)"'s revelation, as the
divine "vicegerent on earth." He cannot do or enact anything contrary to
the Kuran XE "Kuran (Koran, Qu'ran)" or Sunnah. The definition of what is
just depends solely on Allah's will, to which none of the usual moral
criteria found among humans is applicable. "Just" and "unjust" are not
regarded in Islam as intrinsic characteristics of human actions; they are
entirely changeable by divine decree.
Islam is a revealed religion, strongly focused on its grounding in history,
in the historical person of Muhammad XE "Muhammad (Mohamed)," his
revelation and his example. Events as they happened with all recorded or
alleged words and deeds of the Prophet, are the foundation of the faith,
law, and social convention. His sayings and acts guide the lives of all
true Muslims to this day. Whereas imitatio Christi is a voluntary spiritual
endeavor for a pious Christian, all bona fide Muslims are not only morally
and spiritually but also legally obliged to imitate Muhammad.
Contrary to the Christian concept of governmental legitimacy (Romans 13:1),
Islam condemns as rebellion against Allah XE "Allah"'s supremacy the
submission to any other form of law. Muslims believe that Shari'a should be
used as a standard test of validity of all positive laws, "a standard of
values to which all law must be compiled with. Christ XE "Christ"
recognized the realm of human government as legitimate when he said,
"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the
things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21). In Islam there is no such
distinction between church and state.
Shari'a is not at all a "moral law" that guides one's personal map of moral
distinctions, but a blend of political theory and penal law, requiring the
punishment of violators through the sword of the state. It presupposes and
demands the existence of an Islamic state as an executor to enforce the
law. To be legitimate, all political power therefore must rest with those
who enjoy Allah XE "Allah"'s authority on the basis of his revealed will
sent down through his prophet. (Kuran, 5:59) This is the basic pattern of
movement in the universe, within which "politics is in fact no different
from religion: truth comes from on high and on the way down is met by
responsibility moving up. Society is regulated by law and in the Islamic
state the source of law is divine." Politics is not "part of Islam," as
this would imply that in origin it is a distinctly separate sphere of
existence which is then eventually amalgamated with Islam; politics is the
inherent core of the Islamic imperative of Allah's sovereignty. Shari'a is
therefore, strictly speaking, infallible, and a priori incompatible with
any meaningful concept of democracy.
THE WAY FORWARD
Solving the problem of Iraq by appeasing Islamists is the worst possible
strategy for the United States. The Iraqi crisis has political causes that
are neither mysterious nor incurable. Creative solutions may be devised.
They demand flexibility, imagination, and even ruthlessness. An exit
strategy should have three key elements:
First of all, it is necessary to address Sunni concerns about Iraq's
devolution that are rooted in economics rather than constitutional
principles. The United States should support a constitutional arrangement
that would transform Iraq into three (or four, or five) self-governing
entities, as that is what four-fifths of all Iraqis want. Iraq came into
being after the Great War as a British political expedient, and there is
nothing sacrosanct about its "unity." American acceptance of devolution
should be conditional on one essential proviso: all of Iraq's oil must be
jointly controlled and managed, and revenues distributed to the regions
proportionate to their share of the population. An interim agreement
already exists and offers the basis for a lasting formula. This formula
could pave the way for a referendum in October and national elections in
December in which all communities would finally have a stake.
Secondly, to prevent a joint Shiite-Kurdish front the Kurds should be
offered the lure of formally defined autonomy in a decentralized Iraq
(whether Ankara likes that or not). The Kurds also need to be reminded that
in the final analysis they have less reason to fear their dethroned Sunni
neighbors than Grand Ayatollah Sistani and his Shiites in the south whose
long-term goal is to turn the whole of Iraq into an Islamic Republic ruled
by shari'a. The Shiites' continued good will, by contrast, may be purchased
by allowing them to develop closer ties between their putative statelet in
the south and their co-religionists in Iran.
Thirdly, it is essential to try and create a split within the ranks of
Iraqi insurgents between those who are driven primarily by nationalist and
tribal motives, and people like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who don't give a hoot
for Iraq as such but simply want to use it as an episode in the global
anti-American jihad. Establishing a working rapport with such
secular-minded Sunni leaders demands overcoming distaste for a dialogue
with former Baathists. They may be tainted, but a truce and a deal with
them is possible; with the jihadist hard core it is not. The deal with them
could contain the promise of amnesty and a timetable for U.S. disengagement
clearly predicated on improved security situation. American troops could
then be gradually replaced with the contingents from those few relatively
reliable partners we have in the region, notably Egypt and Jordan.
A plan construed along these lines, preferably but not necessarily approved
by a Security Council resolution, could be supported by the E.U. and Russia
if they are offered a lucrative share of a future Iraqi reconstruction
package. It contains many unknowns and may generate new dynamics that are
difficult to predict and control. Unlike anything we've seen coming from
the White House, the Pentagon, or the State Department so far, however, it
also offers a chance for disengagement without any further harm to
America's standing, and without Iraq's further transformation into a
chaotic, ungovernable base for jihad. Whatever it does, the U.S. government
needs to draw the line at allowing an obscurantist and inherently
totalitarian-minded Shiite theocracy to turn the whole of Iraq into a copy
of the Islamic Republic across the Euphrates.
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