Hi Ildar:

Am 09.10.12 06:32 schrieb(en) Ildar Mulyukov:
Albrecht, I didn't mean that Balsa's Key fingerprint is wrong, I mean that 
Balsa's presentation of it is hostile. Compare this:
1. cmd line
        $ gpg2 --search-keys [email protected] | grep DSA
        gpg: поиск "[email protected]" на hkp сервере subkeys.pgp.net
        Keys 1-1 of 1 for "[email protected]".            1024 bit DSA 
key D027FFD1, создан: 2002-04-15

2. Thunderbird: see a shot
2. seahorse: see a shot
3. Balsa: see a shot

Ah, now I understand!

The design is stolen^H^H^H^H^H^H inspired by kmail/kontact which is somehow the 
"reference design" of the Sphinx project by the GnuPG guys and the BSI (see 
screen shot).  Kmail limits the display to 16 hex digits, though.

If a user wants to verify the fingerprint by looking at it, then it is easy 
with Seahorse, TB and even with cmdline gpg, but not with Balsa.

Why should the fingerprint be verified?  All you need is to look at the green/yellow/red 
"traffic lights":

If the key is unknown (red padlock), but the message claims to come from whom you have 
the key, you should ask h(im|er) why the "well known" key isn't used.

If the key is unknown, and coming from someone whose key you don't have, you may want to 
load it from the key server.  If it has been signed by people you trust (read: whose keys 
you trust), the trust level in the just downloaded key will be more or less good (this is 
the yellow padlock case, see the explanation at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust> or 
<http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN335>).

If you trust the person (the key) absolutely (e.g. because [s]he personally 
passed it to you), and you set the trust accordingly, the padlock will be green.

If someone suspects that the key has been abused, it must be revoked and the 
revocation must be uploaded to the key servers, so it will be invalidated (=red 
padlock) in the local key ring when you run 'gpg2 --refresh-keys'.

Dealing with fingerprints is cumbersome, let them be 8, 16 or 32 hex digits 
wide.  Thus, it's debatable whether we should show them at all.

Cheers, Albrecht.

<<inline: kmail_keys.png>>

Attachment: pgpVAkNCGE0Pi.pgp
Description: PGP signature

_______________________________________________
balsa-list mailing list
[email protected]
https://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/balsa-list

Reply via email to