Gaia had a very good suggestion that is overlooked, so I repeat his email: Currently we only have 2 options:
- trust everybody (default) - trust nobody (use the -Y commandline parameter. We need the third option, selectively enable scripts, at loading time. - i care: ask me case by case Why not just add in User preferences: [ ] Auto run scripts (we have this already) [X] Ask for "autorun on load" if general Autorun is disabled This would solve all purposes. Thanks, Erwin On 7 June 2013 07:37, Shrinidhi Rao <[email protected]> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 7, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Ton Roosendaal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi all Pythoneers, > > > > Scripters are important for Blender, but just like the C developers they > > have a responsibility for users out there. A good proposal for security > has > > to come from you as experts first. > > > > Why not have a script that ships with blender, which can be run > individually, which checks the blender file for scripts and informs the > user if it is malicious or safe ? > The script can have a way to update a set of rules that marks the files > safe or unsafe. May be blender institute can maintain a database and the > script will auto-update the rules. > People responsible for the python API can keep updating the database > incrementally. > > Now why a different script? . > 1 : Changing blenders default behavior for running scripts is like killing > a few scripters in studios using blender. > 2 : it can be run individually by the security conscious people . at least > they will have a way to check if a blend file is evil or good . > 3: for large deployments it can be run in batch mode to check multiple > files at once . > > > This way we can make the users happy . at least they will have a way to > tell what the blend file is up to . > In a studio we need not worry about it as there are proper user permissions > and policies already implemented. > > > > > > > If this discussion just leads to marking every idea as impossible (Python > > is insecure by design) then we should have a big problem with keeping > > Python in Blender. Fork it, sandbox it, or move to LUA. > > > > This is not at all constructive! . > Arguing against using python and replacing it with a crippled scripting > language is as good as telling professional studios users to stop using > blender directly. it will not help blender in anyway. first thing they see > is how can data be interchanged between softwares . no studio will dump > their existing softwares and start using blender entirely for all their > production stages . blender should be able to communicate with other > software and a restricted scripting language will not help blender or its > users. > > as it is, i am already feeling crippled without a socket based command port > in blender . there is no way to send a command to blender like opening > files, linking etc! . well . this is not needed if we have only a blender > specific pipeline. but if we want to keep our pipeline UI out of blender > then its very useful > > > > > Let it be clear: we're making Blender here, which is meant to be a 3D > > creation tool. It's not a Python development environment. Users come > first, > > scripters and coders second. So... stop being smartasses and think > > constructive a bit. > > > > > A 3D creation tool without a powerfull scripting api is useless nowadays, > at least for professional users. > Users come first . yes.. i totally agree with you . but the users always > improve and always want more out the software once they become aware that > they can do certain things in blender . And the same users who wanted too > much security will be annoyed by the same security measures once they come > out of their hobbyist attitude and become scripters and coders. > > > > > -Ton- > > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Ton Roosendaal - [email protected] - www.blender.org > > Chairman Blender Foundation - Producer Blender Institute > > Entrepotdok 57A - 1018AD Amsterdam - The Netherlands > > > > > > > > On 7 Jun, 2013, at 12:08, Domino Marama wrote: > > > > > On 06/07/2013 10:21 AM, Ton Roosendaal wrote: > > >> Hi Campbell, > > >> > > >> I don't know enough about Python internals, so I depend on someone to > > help designing a sane way to handle security risks here. There must be > ways > > we can help users? > > >> > > >> Look for example at the standard UI scripts. Apart from 1 case, > there's > > no "import os" anywhere. Same goes for essential scripts riggers or > > animators use. > > >> > > >> So, why not add a provision in Blender code to check on such cases. > > Just don't allow import of any module = safe script? In all other cases: > > needs to be explicitly permitted to run. > > >> > > >> Something like this would make a "trusted source" option on file > > loading more useful. Right now, unticking "trusted source" is almost > > equivalent to "disable useful features". > > >> > > >> > > >>>> oh = 'SOS HELP!' > > >>>> ohoh = __import__(oh[1:3].lower()) > > >>>> ohoh > > > <module 'os' from > > > > > > '/home/domino/Applications/blender-2.67-linux-glibc211-x86_64/2.67/python/lib/python3.3/os.py'> > > > > > > On Linux distros where system Python is used, I doubt anything can be > > > done to prevent the import function from being used. > > > > > > Load Blender with a console, check there's the startup message on it. > > > Then paste this into say the frame number field.. > > > > > > eval("__import__('os').system('clear')", {}) > > > > > > Now check console again.. Just checking scripts for imports isn't > enough. > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Bf-committers mailing list > > > [email protected] > > > http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Bf-committers mailing list > > [email protected] > > http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers > > > > > > -- > > regards > - shrinidhi > > > Even god fails to understand a human until his death! > http://www.linkedin.com/in/shrinidhi666 > https://github.com/shrinidhi666 > > > > <http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3025616> > _______________________________________________ > Bf-committers mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers > _______________________________________________ Bf-committers mailing list [email protected] http://lists.blender.org/mailman/listinfo/bf-committers
