please wrap your lines when possible. <76 characters ideally.

On 17.05.18 08:32, Paul Roberts wrote:
After doing some more packet captures, it looks like a lot of the queries
are related to Sophos live protection DNS lookups (lots of queries for
sophosxl.net), so there are a lot of queries which don't get resolved.  We
see multiple queries for the same name and the resolver seems to
retransmit to each forwarder when it doesn't get a response, including the
non-local ones.  So the behaviour may be being exacerbated by these
non-resolvable queries.  Eventually after about 10 seconds, the forwarder
replies with a SERVFAIL response as it eventually gives up trying to get a
response from the Sophos name servers.

do those forwarders respond?

Because if they don't return anything, or return SERVFAIL, it's expected ang
logical for BIND to try again.

So now I am not sure if the rtt algorithm is completely at fault here as
BIND is simply trying additional forwarders in an attempt to resolve the
name.

apparently not - I remember when having such problem years ago, I have
advised the client to turn those DNS lookups off.  Those lookups were
overloading our DNS servers (not sure fi sophos).

I have seen this live protection stuff going on in quite a few corporates
now, and each time we have had to raise the recursive-client limit.  I
don't think it's just Sophos that do this, pretty sure I saw this with
McAfee a couple years ago too, they seem to use DNS to transmit file name
hashes so they can do a reputation lookup, but for Sophos they only reply
if some kind of action is required.  There must be many corporates out
there that are experiencing issues with the way this works, i.e all of a
sudden their resolvers stop recursing because the recursive client limit
is hit.

One account I am working on, the resolvers regularly hit 20,000+ recursive
clients when they kick of a scheduled virus scan.  I wish the anti-virus
vendors would consider the impact they are having on corporate DNS
environments and re-think how they implement their reputation lookups, it
must be the cause of some pretty serious ouages.  :-(

this kind of protection apparently should not be run on public DNS
infrastructure.

--
Matus UHLAR - fantomas, uh...@fantomas.sk ; http://www.fantomas.sk/
Warning: I wish NOT to receive e-mail advertising to this address.
Varovanie: na tuto adresu chcem NEDOSTAVAT akukolvek reklamnu postu.
One OS to rule them all, One OS to find them, One OS to bring them all and into darkness bind them _______________________________________________
Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe 
from this list

bind-users mailing list
bind-users@lists.isc.org
https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users

Reply via email to