Update: This was not the fraud we thought it was
We have learned that emails we originally identified as abuse were sent by an external contractor engaged by ISC to conduct a focussed and short-term lead generation campaign. We have instructed the vendor to halt that campaign. We clearly suffered some communications failures here. Our communication with the vendor should have made it clear that we would not be comfortable with the approach they adopted. Plus, our internal communication failed as we lacked sufficient awareness of the campaign to respond in a more appropriate fashion when we received questions about the emails. We have been assured by the vendor that this was not a bulk unsolicited email campaign. We affirm our stance that bulk unsolicited email is counter to our mission in support of Internet infrastructure. We apologize for any inconvenience or disruption this event may have caused. We promptly canceled our abuse complaint concerning the domain name, and we ask any of you who have taken any filtering or blocking or complaint action against the domain name or the originating IP addresses to do the same. We appreciate the outpouring of sympathy from our community, many of whom have emailed us with helpful suggestions. We thank you for your continued support. > On Jun 25, 2024, at 10:42 AM, Victoria Risk <vi...@isc.org> wrote: > > BIND-users, > > Someone is sending emails from tryisc.com, pretending to be from Internet > Systems Corporation, and offering information about undisclosed BIND software > vulnerabilities. These emails are NOT from ISC, the authors of BIND, and they > are not authorized by ISC. > > If you feel you have received illegitimate communications from someone > purporting to be an ISC staff member, please report it > (https://www.isc.org/security-report/). If someone other than ISC.org is > offering to provide software vulnerability information about ISC software, > this is suspicious and probably fraudulent. ISC does offer professional > support services, which includes advance notification of security > vulnerabilities in our software but we have not authorized anyone else to > disclose that information prior to public disclosure. > > Be safe out there, and check the domain name if you are not sure about the > sender. ISC.org <http://isc.org/> is signed, so you can also validate it > (since you are all operating resolvers, right?). > > Vicky Risk (working at the actual ISC.org <http://isc.org/>) >
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