Hi Nagesh,
Please seem my comments inline.
On 3/18/26 13:11, Nagesh Thati wrote:
Hello Matthijs,
I wanted to follow up on my earlier question regarding using dnssec-
policy with externally generated keys in BIND 9.18.35 and share that the
suggested approach worked successfully.
To summarize what worked for our implementation:
1. Using the -G flag with dnssec-keygen to generate pregenerated keys
with no timing metadata (only the Created field is present). This was
the key insight we were missing — our keys previously had full timing
metadata which caused BIND's KASP engine to mishandle them.
Sounds good.
2. Copying the pregenerated keys to the key directory and running 'rndc
loadkeys' is sufficient for BIND to detect and schedule the rollover
automatically. There is no need to run 'rndc dnssec -rollover' for
normal lifecycle rollovers — doing so prematurely caused immediate key
deletion in our testing, bypassing the double-signature phase entirely.
Correct. Only if you have key lifetime unlimited, you will need to run
'rndc dnssec -rollover'. Some operators like to control when they start
rolling their key (external to BIND 9), but you can rely on
dnssec-policy's key lifetime, as long as you pregenerate the keys before
the successor needs to be pre-published.
3. BIND's KASP engine correctly treats keys generated with -G as
successor candidates and manages all timing, pre-publication, and
activation automatically based on the dnssec-policy configuration.
> > One additional observation that may be useful to others: copying
successor keys too early (well before the rollover window) causes BIND
to set GoalState: hidden on the new keys, effectively rejecting them.
The successor key should be copied within a reasonable window before the
scheduled rollover — not immediately after the current key is activated.
The GoalState and other states on pregenerated keys are initialized to
hidden. That should not prevent those keys from being selected as a
successor.
In other words, it shouldn't matter when you copy the keys to the
key-directory. If you observed differently, please provide a reproducer
and create a new issue:
https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/issues/new
We are now successfully using this approach to externally manage DNSSEC
key generation while letting BIND handle all signing, re-signing, and
rollover operations automatically via dnssec-policy.
Great to hear!
Do you have any recommendations on how to improve our documentation, to
avoid common pitfalls for others?
Thank you again for the guidance and for pointing us to the relevant
section of the ISC Knowledge Base. It made a significant difference in
our implementation.
Glad I could be of assistance,
Best regards,
Matthijs
Thanks,
Nagesh
On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 2:53 PM Matthijs Mekking <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hello Nagesh,
This should be possible, this section of the KB article should be of
interest to you:
https://kb.isc.org/docs/dnssec-key-and-signing-policy#importing-
dnssec-keys <https://kb.isc.org/docs/dnssec-key-and-signing-
policy#importing-dnssec-keys>
The takeaway is that you should not set timing metadata in the key
files
(other than Created). Keys without timing metadata are considered
pregenerated keys and are eligible candidates to become successor keys.
Also don't set "Predecessor"/"Successor" metadata, dnssec-policy will
set those when selecting a successor key.
Furthermore, depending on what 9.18 version you are running, there may
be bugs in older versions that cause existing keys to retire too soon.
On 3/17/26 06:02, Nagesh Thati wrote:
> Hello BIND Community,
>
> I am working on a solution that integrates with BIND 9.18 for
DNSSEC key
> management. I would like to share a behavior I have observed and
seek
> guidance from the community on the best approach.
>
>
> Background
> ==========
>
> Our architecture is as follows:
>
> - My solution is responsible for generating DNSSEC keys (KSK and
ZSK)
> using dnssec-keygen.
> - The generated keys are copied to the BIND key directory
configured via
> the key-directory directive.
> - BIND is configured with dnssec-policy to handle automatic zone
signing
> and re-signing.
> - My solution monitors key Inactive times and generates new
replacement
> keys ahead of rollover, copying them to the key directory when
rollover
> time approaches.
> - We then run 'rndc loadkeys <zone>' to signal BIND to pick up
the new keys.
>
> Our dnssec-policy configuration is as follows:
>
> dnssec-policy "managed-keys" {
> keys {
> ksk lifetime P365D algorithm ecdsap256sha256;
> zsk lifetime P30D algorithm ecdsap256sha256;
> };
> };
> zone "dnssectest.com <http://dnssectest.com> <http://
dnssectest.com <http://dnssectest.com>>" IN {
> type master;
> file "/var/named/zones/db.dnssectest.com <http://
db.dnssectest.com> <http://
> db.dnssectest.com <http://db.dnssectest.com>>";
> key-directory "/var/named/keys";
> inline-signing yes;
> dnssec-policy "managed-keys";
> };
>
> Observed Issue
> ==============
>
> When testing our key rollover logic, we simulate an approaching
expiry
> by manually changing the Inactive time of the current ZSK or KSK
to 2-3
> days from now. We then generate a new replacement key and copy it
to the
> key directory, followed by running 'rndc loadkeys'.
>
> The observed behavior is:
>
> 1. For ZSK rollover: BIND's KASP engine detects the newly copied
ZSK in
> the key directory and automatically retires it, instead of
treating it
> as the incoming replacement key.
>
> 2. For KSK rollover: The same behavior is observed — the newly
copied
> KSK is auto-retired by KASP shortly after being picked up.
>
> This appears to happen because BIND's KASP engine takes ownership
of all
> keys present in the key directory and manages their lifecycle
> independently, overriding the timing metadata we have set on the
newly
> copied keys.
>
>
> Questions
> =========
>
> 1. Is there a supported way to use dnssec-policy while having an
> external application manage key generation and rollover, with
BIND only
> responsible for signing and re-signing?
No. BIND can do DNSSEC maintenance for you, or you have to do key and
signature maintenance manually with dnssec-signzone.
Your best choice is to set key lifetimes to unlimited, and when
there is
a new key rollover, drop the key files into the configured key-
directory
and issue a 'rndc dnssec -rollover' command.
> 2. Is there a mechanism to signal to BIND's KASP engine that a newly
> copied key should be treated as a pre-publication replacement key
for an
> upcoming rollover, rather than a new independent key?
As you have experienced, excess keys with key timing metadata will be
retired. Try copying the key files of the successor key without setting
timing metadata.
> 3. Does BIND 9.18's KASP engine honor the Publish, Activate,
Inactive,
> and Delete timing metadata set on externally generated keys when
they
> are copied to the key directory, or does it always recalculate and
> override these values based on the active dnssec-policy?
Nope. BIND will set those timing metadata given the dnssec-policy.
It is
merely used to inform the user when it can expect a key to become
published, active, inactive and removed from the zone.
> 4. Is the 'auto-dnssec maintain' directive (without dnssec-
policy) still
> a viable option for this use case in BIND 9.18, given that it is
> deprecated? Are there plans to remove it in an upcoming release?
It is already removed in 9.20, so I wouldn't consider it viable.
> 5. Are there any plans in future BIND versions to support an
"external
> key provider" interface or a "bring your own key" (BYOK) model
within
> the KASP framework?
It should work as I described above.
If not, feel free to create an issue in our GitLab:
https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/issues/new <https://
gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/issues/new>
Best regards,
Matthijs
> What We Have Tried
> ==================
>
> - Using 'lifetime unlimited' in dnssec-policy to prevent BIND
from auto-
> generating replacement keys. However, BIND still auto-retires newly
> copied keys when it detects them in the key directory.
>
> - Using 'auto-dnssec maintain' with 'inline-signing yes' without
dnssec-
> policy. This works correctly and respects our key timing
metadata, but
> we are concerned about relying on a deprecated directive for a
> production system.
>
> - Manually editing the .private file and running 'rndc loadkeys'.
BIND
> picks up the timing changes but KASP still overrides the lifecycle
> management of newly added keys.
>
>
> Environment
> ===========
>
> - BIND Version: 9.18.x
> - OS: Alma Linux
> - Key Algorithm: ECDSAP256SHA256
> - ZSK Lifetime: 30 days
> - KSK Lifetime: 365 days
>
>
> Any guidance, suggestions, or pointers to relevant documentation or
> discussions would be greatly appreciated. We want to ensure our
> implementation is aligned with BIND's intended design and is
forward-
> compatible with future releases.
>
> Thank you for your time and assistance.
>
> Best regards
> Nagesh
>
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