It won't work as you thought. If a miner has 95% of hashing power, he
would have 95% of chance to find the next block and collect the penalty.
In long term, he only needs to pay 5% penalty. It's clearly biased
against small miners.
Instead, you should require the miners to burn the penalty. Whether this
is a good idea is another issue.
Wes Green via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-08-06 19:52 寫到:
Bitcoin is built on game theory. Somehow we seem to have forgotten
that and are trying to fix our "block size issue" with magic numbers,
projected percentage growth of bandwidth speeds, time limits, etc...
There are instances where these types of solutions make sense, but
this doesn't appear to be one of them. Lets return to game theory.
Proposal: Allow any miner to, up to, double the block size at any
given time - but penalize them. Using the normal block reward,
whatever percentage increase the miner makes over the previous limit
is taken from both the normal reward and fees. The left over is
rewarded to the next miner that finds a block.
If blocks stay smaller for an extended period of time, it goes back
down to the previous limit/ x amount decrease/% decrease (up for
debate)
Why would this work?: Miners only have incentive to do raise the limit
when they feel there is organic growth in the network. Spam attacks,
block bloat etc would have to be dealt with as it is currently. There
is no incentive to raise the size for spam because it will subside and
the penalty will have been for nothing when the attack ends and block
size goes back down.
I believe it would have the nice side effect of forcing miners to hold
the whole block chain. I believe SPV does not allow you to see all the
transactions in a block and be able to calculate if you should be
adding more to your reward transaction if the last miner made the
blocks bigger. Because of this, the miners would also have an eye on
blockchain size and wont want it getting huge too fast (outsize of
Moore's law of Nielsen's Law). Adding to the gamification.
This system would encourage block size growth due to organic growth
and the penalty would encourage it to be slow as to still keep reward
high and preserve ROE.
What this would look like: The miners start seeing what looks like
natural network growth, and make the decision (or program an
algorithm, the beauty is it leaves the "how" up to the miners) to
increase the blocksize. They think that, in the long run, having
larger blocks will increase their revenue and its worth taking the hit
now for more fees later. They increase the size to 1.25 MB. As a
result, they reward would be 18.75 (75%). The miner fees were .5BTC.
The miner fees are also reduced to .375BTC. Everyone who receives that
block can easily calculate 1) if the previous miner gave themselves
the proper reward 2) what the next reward should be if they win it.
Miners now start building blocks with a 31.25 reward transaction and
miner fee + .125.
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