-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 03/27/2017 10:29 AM, Tom Zander via bitcoin-dev wrote: > For some time now the relation between block size and propagation > speed has been decoupled. Using xthin/compact blocks miners only > send a tiny version of a block which then causes the receiving node > to re-create it using the memory pool. Immediately getting double > benefits by including pre-verified transactions from the memory > pool you avoid the old problem of having to validate them again > when a block was mined. > > As such there is no downside to a miner creating a bigger block, as > long as all the transactions they include are actually in the > mempool.
All transactions being publicly available is not something that can be assumed. With no opportunity cost for a miner to generate withheld transactions, a larger miner still maintains the economic advantage of latency as a function of block size. Fast relay works to reduce latency in relation to the opportunity cost created by the space constraint. IOW, the more fees a miner must give up to mine withheld transactions, the greater the economic disadvantage of doing so. So there is a "downside" (i.e. centralization pressure) up to the point where the advantage gained from withholding transactions turns negative. The rational competing miner must presume that a block is valid upon confirming the announcement's PoW. He then has the choice of mining on top of the (partially-visible) block, or ignoring it until it can be fully populated. The former *eliminates fee opportunity*, since the next block must remain free of all public fee-generating transactions until all of the preceding block's transactions are visible. The latter increases orphaning probability, since it implies mining on the weak chain, which *increases total reward loss*. One can conclude that no matter how much space is created, it will always be filled by a rational miner, as a competitive necessity, given the centralizing effect of latency. Making blocks big enough to include low cost transactions nullifies the benefits of fast relay techniques based on your above assumption, since a rational miner will simply substitute withheld transactions. e -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJY2W+bAAoJEDzYwH8LXOFOzkwH+wUulsdvUcfEHMspolfDjTD+ f4egP1FDoOFgXzaGJ+Bq1AjWP+CDYup9msYhp1NTk6xRnG4uGvaEA3DFYGbAzLut INtkpCi38O1QGtDJaxmkJHXLoWJPS6VudcDEoam4W6qSKgHFB+ZRnIN4T7jnGMLI rp/cGdom9wE/pcq/fvF/fonGfVWf/YP2YjBzJzaJy+zOYPTH2rNcnYBCHFPs4/KX 9Gu7tDw9WNxM5idnd0TiidublQhYui6xo7ZbZpmXQePcHQoQO5XqaO6yWwiWRWaU mqXhalASOtP6xnPzj6FfAHYS7qA7JCaDfwT8UIzt9xv9XsPrhQ/r6Sfgfhvbm2k= =b9sf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
