Please read my email more carefully; the replay threat would be moot because
there would be no alternative chain to replay the TX on, as the non-148 chain
would have been reorganized into oblivion.
Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable
Local Time: June 7, 2017 3:26 AM
UTC Time: June 7, 2017 12:26 AM
From: cont...@taoeffect.com
To: Kekcoin <kekc...@protonmail.com>
Anthony Towns <a...@erisian.com.au>, bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot."
If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious
one.
--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with
the NSA.
On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <kekc...@protonmail.com> wrote:
Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the fact
that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to unilaterally
(ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is more secure in
extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks (as unfeasibly
expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the
non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore
render the replay threat moot.
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