Will there be a “Do nothing” soft fork, showing that the community can still moving forward?
So all the nodes get to upgrade to use tx version 2, and that avoid a chain split. Are you support that or against that, why? Regards, LIN Zheming > 在 2017年6月15日，上午4:11，Jameson Lopp <jameson.l...@gmail.com> 写道： > > > > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 12:04 PM, Zheming Lin <hea...@gmail.com > <mailto:hea...@gmail.com>> wrote: > Hi Jameson: > >> 在 2017年6月15日，02:55，Jameson Lopp <jameson.l...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jameson.l...@gmail.com>> 写道： >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <hea...@gmail.com >> <mailto:hea...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> Hi Jameson: >> >>> 在 2017年6月15日，01:20，Jameson Lopp <jameson.l...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:jameson.l...@gmail.com>> 写道： >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> > 在 2017年6月14日，02:11，Gregory Maxwell <g...@xiph.org <mailto:g...@xiph.org>> >>> > 写道： >>> > >>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >>> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: >>> >>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just >>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8, >>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is >>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current >>> > degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security >>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system. >>> > >>> >>> 是的，用户永远都有选择，并可以抛弃那些节点。这个 BIP >>> 并没有反对这些用户这么做。只有那些被动的钱包用户，他们需要知道必须做出一个选择。（而不是被动的跟随默认的策略） >>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP >>> does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s >>> passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one. >>> >>> 这个 BIP 可以被应用于几乎任何的升级上，包括隔离见证，两兆的隔离见证，两兆扩容，涌现共识，八兆扩容等。但这些升级并不是重点。 >>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, >>> 2m, ec, 8m… but the upgrade is not the key point. >>> >>> 到底我们的用户是否真的拥有选择？ >>> Did the users have any real choice? >>> >>> 我并不能理解他们相信大部分矿工（就像当前一样），但拒绝这些多数矿工对协议改变的投票结果。 >>> I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but >>> refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>> >>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the >>> term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a >>> feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that >>> they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too >>> "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users >>> may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not >>> show readiness for enforcing the new rules. >> >> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But >> what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork? >> >> I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly suggest >> an other word for that? >> >> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree >> with this or not? >> >> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of >> communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to >> signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that >> to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty >> tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast >> majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of >> consensus rules. >> > > “Sybil attack”. The genuine node will leave the chain if it doesn’t like the > change. That’s what restrain the majority miners acting foolishly. > > If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don’t the fork away(and not > afraid of replay attack). I think it’s a way to move forward together. > > Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to decide? > > The concept of "sybil attacks" doesn't really apply to enforcing network-wide > consensus changes. Even if someone spooled up 100 times more nodes than > currently exist and they all "signal" for some consensus rule change, that > doesn't compel the rest of the "genuine" nodes to change the rules they > enforce. > > The users always have a choice with regard to what consensus rules to enforce > and what software to run. Everyone is welcome to propose changes and write > software that they make available to users. >> Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described >> as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no actual >> power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node is >> free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules >> other entities are enforcing. >>> >>> >>> 对钱包用户的选择，是他们是否相信多数矿工。如果他们不相信，可以通过分叉来消除掉矿工。 >>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% >>> majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of >>> miners. >>> >>> 如果他们仍旧相信矿工，那么可以留下来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。 >>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for >>> upcoming protocol upgrade. >>> >>> 所以问题在于：比特币的开发者、用户、拥有者、服务提供者、甚至矿工，是否（仍然）如白皮书中描述的对大多数矿工拥有信任。 >>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service >>> provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as >>> designed in the white paper? >>> >>> >>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white paper >>> refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to >>> determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ >>> chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the >>> correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid >>> chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners >>> (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they >>> wish to enforce. >>> >> >> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 >> temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can >> leave as always. >> >> From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confirming >> transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft fork, >> yes. > > And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a “soft fork”? > > As far as I know - if you're only restricting the validation rules then it > should be a non-breaking change. > > Regards, > > LIN Zheming
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