Trezor's "plausible deniability" scheme could very well result in you going to
jail for lying to border security, because it's so easy for them to simply
brute force alternate passwords based on your seeds. With that, they have proof
that you lied to customs, a serious offense.
The passphrase scheme as I understand it allows a maximum of 50
characters to be used. Surely even with the HD seed, that search space
is too large to brute force. Or is there a weakness in the scheme I
haven't clocked?
On 09/01/18 01:13, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 07:40:38PM -0500, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev wrote:
I think you're under-appreciating how useful the "plausible deniability". Someone I know
was (solo) traveling to the United States when a border agent asked her to unlocked her phone;
thumbed through her apps, ended up finding tinder and went through all her recent conversations to
make sure she wasn't involved in any "pay for sex things".
In the same light, I travel frequently and constantly have my trezor on me. If
I am asked to unlock it, I will have no problems doing so (as refusal will no
doubt lead to deportation) and showing my personal wallet (which sadly hasn't
had much use since fees became ridiculous).
Trezor's "plausible deniability" scheme could very well result in you going to
jail for lying to border security, because it's so easy for them to simply
brute force alternate passwords based on your seeds. With that, they have proof
that you lied to customs, a serious offense.
I would strongly advise you not to use it in that situation.
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