On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 1:06 AM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > The rule AFAICT is "standard transactions must still work". This was > violated with low-S, but the transformation was arguably trivial.
That is my view, generally. Like any other principle, its applicability is modulated by the specific facts. For low-s the most critical mitigating specific facts were (in order of importance): Any third party could malleate non-conforming transactions to make them conform and that code to do this was written and run, that S-value malleation was being actively attacked at the time, and that the intention to eventually enforce lowS had been made clear a long time ahead and the vast majority of transactions were already conforming. In particular these facts meant that the change could not result in the confiscation of funds except in the case of a key-destroyed unconfirmed chain of timelock transactions which was already highly vulnerable due to the malleation attacks -- and even there, the non-standardness step itself wouldn't destroy the funds esp. given the malleation risk redemption of that sort of chain would probably be best accomplished with the collaboration of a miner. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
