I don't think this is a realistic concern. The incentive compatibility
_already_ exists (just in reverse: miners are refusing transactions that would
increase their total fees in the next block), and as the mempool is already
generally competitive enough it's actually worse the way it is.
But I don't think it makes sense to take a zealous approach on "incentive
compatibility". Bitcoin is already built on a whole bunch of incentive
incompatible behaviors, even things as simple as "change outputs" (you'd be
better off privately giving your transaction to trusted miners without change,
who deduct the min fee they would've needed and refund the rest OOB). Not to
mention, we expect miners to avoid reorgs and stuff even if it's in their
short-term interest.
At least personally, I think DoS risks are the real concern.
-Ryan
-------- Original Message --------
On January 28, 2018 12:29 PM, David A. Harding <d...@dtrt.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 05:43:34PM +0100, Sjors Provoost via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
>> Peter Todd wrote:
>>
>>> In fact I considered only requiring an increase in fee rate, based on the
>>> theory that if absolute fee went down, the transaction must be smaller and
>>> thus
>>> miners could overall earn more from the additional transactions they could
>>> fit
>>> into their block. But to do that properly requires considering whether or
>>> not
>>> that's actually true in the particular state the mempool as a whole happens
>>> to
>>> be in, so I ditched that idea early on for the much simpler criteria of
>>> both a
>>> feerate and absolute fee increase.
>>
>> Why would you need to consider the whole mempool?
>
> Imagine a miner is only concerned with creating the next block and his
> mempool currently only has 750,000 vbytes in it. If two 250-vbyte
> transactions each paying a feerate of 100 nanobitcoins per vbyte (50k
> total) are replaced with one 325-vbyte transaction paying a feerate of
> 120 nBTC (39k total), the miner's potential income from mining the next
> block is reduced by 11k nBTC.
>
> Moving away from this easily worked example, the problem can still exist
> even if a miner has enough transactions to fill the next block. For
> replacement consideration only by increased feerate to be guaranteed
> more profitable, one has to assume the mempool contains an effectively
> continuous distribution of feerates. That may one day be true of the
> mempool (it would be good, because it helps keep block production
> regular sans subsidy) but it's often not the case these days.
>
> -Dave
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