Hi Tristan, Regarding the "Post-Quantum Address Recovery" part (I haven't read the other parts), you may be interested in my message to the list from last month and the rest of the thread: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-January/015659.html
This is an approach which aims to avoid the issues that you've mentioned in your blog post. Best, Tim On Tue, 2018-02-13 at 01:13 +1100, Tristan Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hi all, > > Recently I've been exploring what a post-quantum attack on Bitcoin > would actually look like, and what options exist for mitigating it. > > I've put up a draft of my research here: https://medium.com/@tristanh > oy/11271f430c41 > > In summary: > 1) None of the recommended post-quantum DSAs (XMSS, SPHINCS) are > scalable > 2) This is a rapidly advancing space and committment to a specific > post-quantum DSA now would be premature > 3) I've identified a strategy (solution 3 in the draft) that > mitigates against the worst case scenario (unexpectedly early attack > on ECDSA) without requiring any changes to the Bitcoin protocol or > total committment to a specific post-quantum DSA that will likely be > superseded in the next 3-5 years > 4) This strategy also serves as a secure means of transferring > balances into a post-quantum DSA address space, even in the event > that ECDSA is fully compromised and the transition is reactionary > > The proposal is a change to key generation only and will be > implemented by wallet providers. > > Feedback would be most appreciated. > > Regards, > > Tristan > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
