I think this needs significantly improved motivation/description. A few areas I'd like to see calculated out:
1) wrt rule 3, for this to be obviously-incentive-compatible-for-the-next-miner, I'd think no evicted transactions would be allowed to be in the next block range. This would probably require some significant additional tracking in today's mempool logic. 2) wrt rule 4, I'd like to see a calculation of worst-case free relay. I think we're already not in a great place, but maybe it's worth it or maybe there is some other way to reduce this cost (intuitively it looks like this proposal could make things very, very, very bad). 3) wrt rule 5, I'd like to see benchmarks, it's probably a pretty nasty DoS attack, but it may also be the case that is (a) not worse than other fundamental issues or (b) sufficiently expensive. 4) As I've indicated before, I'm generaly not a fan of such vague protections for time-critical transactions such as payment channel punishment transactions. At a high-level, in this context your counterparty's transactions (not to mention every other transaction in everyone's mempool) are still involved in the decision about whether to accept an RBF, in contrast to previous proposals, which makes it much harder to reason about. As a specific example, if an attacker exploits mempool policy differences they may cause your concept of "top 4M weight" to be bogus for a subeset of nodes, causing propogation to be limited. Obviously there is also a ton more client-side knowledge required and complexity to RBF decisions here than other previous, more narrowly-targeted proposals. (I don't think this one use-case being not optimal should prevent such a proposal, i agree it's quite nice for some other cases). Matt > On Jun 2, 2019, at 06:41, Rusty Russell <ru...@rustcorp.com.au> wrote: > > Hi all, > > I want to propose a modification to rules 3, 4 and 5 of BIP 125: > > To remind you of BIP 125: > 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum > paid by the original transactions. > > 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at > or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting. > > 5. The number of original transactions to be replaced and their > descendant transactions which will be evicted from the mempool must not > exceed a total of 100 transactions. > > The new "emergency RBF" rule: > > 6. If the original transaction was not in the first 4,000,000 weight > units of the fee-ordered mempool and the replacement transaction is, > rules 3, 4 and 5 do not apply. > > This means: > > 1. RBF can be used in adversarial conditions, such as lightning > unilateral closes where the adversary has another valid transaction > and can use it to block yours. This is a problem when we allow > differential fees between the two current lightning transactions > (aka "Bring Your Own Fees"). > > 2. RBF can be used without knowing about miner's mempools, or that the > above problem is occurring. One simply gets close to the required > maximum height for lightning timeout, and bids to get into the next > block. > > 3. This proposal does not open any significant new ability to RBF spam, > since it can (usually) only be used once. IIUC bitcoind won't > accept more that 100 descendents of an unconfirmed tx anyway. > > 4. This proposal makes RBF miner-incentive compatible. Currently the > protocol tells miners they shouldn't accept the highest bidding tx > for the good of the network. This conflict is particularly sharp > in the case where the replacement tx would be immediately minable, > which this proposal addresses. > > Unfortunately I haven't found time to code this up in bitcoin, but if > there's positive response I can try. > > Thanks for reading! > Rusty. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
