On 31/07/2019 16:50, Dmitry Petukhov wrote: > В Tue, 30 Jul 2019 22:39:14 +0100 > Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> > wrote: > >> This is where a sacrifice of V bitcoins creates a >> bond of value V^2. The formula provides a strong incentive for >> profit-motivated makers to use all their fidelity bond coins with just >> one maker, not spread them out over many makers. > > The attacker derives additional value from the use of > locked utxo - the deanonimyzation capabilities. > > An entity M can use all of its locked coins to run a maker, and then > earn value X. It will also incur some operational expenses in the course > of running the maker, so the profit will be less than X. > > If these locked coins are given to the attacker A as a package, an > attacker can derive a value of X+D where D is a value of increased > deanonymization capabilities for an attacker. Operational expenses > for an attacker are the same as before (without timelocked bonds), > because they need to operate a lot of makers either way. > > If M is profit-driven and non-ideological, it can rent out all of its > coins to A as a package, for the price X, and get the same value without > running a maker and dedicating any resources and time to it, not > incurring any operatinal expenses (thus having a bigger profit in the > end). > > Attacker A will run a maker with M's coins, get profit X, pay X to M, > get increased deanonymization capabilities. > > If renting out of utxo is done in a way that the owner always gets X > after the lock expires, the operation will be riskless for the owner. > The attacker will need to lock amount X along with owner's coins, but > hopefully makes X back by running a maker operation. > > The price for renting out the coins will be determined on the size of > the 'coin package', so it will not be feasible for the owners of the > coins to rent them out separately. > > An attacker can even rent coins from several entities and combine them > to create a more 'powerful' maker. If I understand correctly, such > 'powerful' maker can have bigger profit than two less 'powerful' > makers. It seems like a centralization risk to me. >
There's a few different issues here. Yes TXO fidelity bonds can be rented out, but that doesn't make a sybil attack cheaper. The aim of the fidelity bond scheme is to require makers to sacrifice value, renting out their fidelity bond coins doesn't avoid that sacrifice because the sacrifice is the paid rent. Because of the maths and market forces the rent paid by the attacker should be about the same as the cost of just buying the bitcoins and locking them. Centralization and decentralization are not ends in themselves, the main aim in JoinMarket is to improve privacy while keeping the other properties of bitcoin (e.g. censorship resistance). A single maker can never deanonoymize coinjoins no matter how valuable their bond is, because takers always choose multiple makers, and all of them need to be controlled by the sybil attacker for the attack to succeed. If a sybil attacker splits up their fidelity bonds (rented or not) amongst multiple maker bots then they reduce the value of their bonds because of the V^2 term. Rented TXOs does destroy the effect of "A long-term holder probably won't want to attack a system like JoinMarket which makes his own investment coins more private and more fungible". However this is not the main effect which would protect JoinMarket's privacy. The main effect is the cost which for real-life numbers would be about 45-120 bitcoin sent to burner outputs. Perhaps then rented TXOs is an argument against using coin age as a way to create fidelity bonds. Hodlers would be far less likely to rent out their coins if they have to specifically move them to a special time-locked address. Another point is that for privacy reasons creators of fidelity bonds should mix their coins before and after using them, because those TXOs are revealed to the world. So it's likely that fidelity bonds creators will need to install and run JoinMarket anyway. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
