Good morning Ethan,
> To avoid derailing the NO_INPUT conversation, I have changed the > subject to OP_CAT. > > Responding to: > """ > > - `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly > retained from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on > par with: > [..] > > - `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends > [..] > """ > > OP_CAT is an extremely valuable op code. I understand why it was > removed as the situation at the time with scripts was dire. However > most of the protocols I've wanted to build on Bitcoin run into the > limitation that stack values can not be concatenated. For instance > TumbleBit would have far smaller transaction sizes if OP_CAT was > supported in Bitcoin. If it happens to me as a researcher it is > probably holding other people back as well. If I could wave a magic > wand and turn on one of the disabled op codes it would be OP_CAT. Of > course with the change that size of each concatenated value must be 64 > Bytes or less. Why 64 bytes in particular? It seems obvious to me that this 64 bytes is most suited for building Merkle trees, being the size of two SHA256 hashes. However we have had issues with the use of Merkle trees in Bitcoin blocks. Specifically, it is difficult to determine if a hash on a Merkle node is the hash of a Merkle subnode, or a leaf transaction. My understanding is that this is the reason for now requiring transactions to be at least 80 bytes. The obvious fix would be to prepend the type of the hashed object, i.e. add at least one byte to determine this type. Taproot for example uses tagged hash functions, with a different tag for leaves, and tagged hashes are just prepend-this-32-byte-constant-twice-before-you-SHA256. This seems to indicate that to check merkle tree proofs, an `OP_CAT` with only 64 bytes max output size would not be sufficient. Or we could implement tagged SHA256 as a new opcode... Regards, ZmnSCPxj > > On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 10:04 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote: > > > > Good morning lists, > > Let me propose the below radical idea: > > > > - `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly retained > > from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on par with: > > - 1 RETURN > > - higher-`nSequence` replacement > > - DER-encoded pubkeys > > - unrestricted `scriptPubKey` > > - Payee-security-paid-by-payer (i.e. lack of P2SH) > > - `OP_CAT` and `OP_MULT` and `OP_ADD` and friends > > - transaction malleability > > - probably many more > > > > So let me propose the more radical excision, starting with SegWit v1: > > > > - Remove `SIGHASH` from signatures. > > - Put `SIGHASH` on public keys. > > > > Public keys are now encoded as either 33-bytes (implicit `SIGHASH_ALL`) or > > 34-bytes (`SIGHASH` byte, followed by pubkey type, followed by pubkey > > coordinate). > > `OP_CHECKSIG` and friends then look at the public key to determine sighash > > algorithm rather than the signature. > > As we expect public keys to be indirectly committed to on every output > > `scriptPubKey`, this is automatically output tagging to allow particular > > `SIGHASH`. > > However, we can then utilize the many many ways to hide public keys away > > until they are needed, exemplified in MAST-inside-Taproot. > > I propose also the addition of the opcode: > > > > <sighash> <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH > > > > > > - `sighash` must be one byte. > > - `pubkey` may be the special byte `0x1`, meaning "just use the Taproot > > internal pubkey". > > - `pubkey` may be 33-byte public key, in which case the `sighash` byte is > > just prepended to it. > > - `pubkey` may be 34-byte public key with sighash, in which case the > > first byte is replaced with `sighash` byte. > > - If `sighash` is `0x00` then the result is a 33-byte public key (the > > sighash byte is removed) i.e. `SIGHASH_ALL` implicit. > > > > This retains the old feature where the sighash is selected at > > time-of-spending rather than time-of-payment. > > This is done by using the script: > > > > <pubkey> OP_SETPUBKEYSIGHASH OP_CHECKSIG > > > > > > Then the sighash can be put in the witness stack after the signature, > > letting the `SIGHASH` flag be selected at time-of-signing, but only if the > > SCRIPT specifically is formed to do so. > > This is malleability-safe as the signature still commits to the `SIGHASH` > > it was created for. > > However, by default, public keys will not have an attached `SIGHASH` byte, > > implying `SIGHASH_ALL` (and disallowing-by-default non-`SIGHASH_ALL`). > > This removes the problems with `SIGHASH_NONE` `SIGHASH_SINGLE`, as they are > > allowed only if the output specifically says they are allowed. > > Would this not be a superior solution? > > Regards, > > ZmnSCPxj > > > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > Lightning-dev mailing list > lightning-...@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
