CTV does not enable this afaiu because it does not commit to the inputs (otherwise there's a hash cycle for predicting the output's TXID.
-- @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin> On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 7:39 AM Dmitry Petukhov <d...@simplexum.com> wrote: > Just had an idea that an an "inverse timelock" can be made > almost-certainly automatic: a revocation UTXO shall become > anyone-can-spend after a timeout, and bear some non-dust amount. > > Before the timelock expiration, it shall be spendable only along with > the covenant-locked 'main' UTXO (via a signature or mutual covenant) > > This way, after a timeout expires, a multitude of entities will be > incentivized to spend this UTXO, because this would be free money for > them. It will probably be spend by a miner, as they can always replace > the spending transaction with their own and claim the amount. > > After the revocation UTXO is spent, the covenant path that commits to > having it in the inputs will be unspendable, and this would effectively > constitute an "inverse timelock". > > >
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
