Ultimately there is only one answer to this question. Get majority hash power support.
Soft fork enforcement is the same act as any other censorship enforcement, the difference is only a question of what people want. Given that there is no collective “we”, those wants differ. Bitcoin resolves this question of conflicting wants, but it is not a democracy, it’s a market. One votes by trading. If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It’s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that’s your vote. Otherwise, as mentioned below, anyone can start a new coin. But it’s dishonest to imply that one can do this and all others will surely follow. This cannot be known, it’s merely a gamble. And it’s one that has been shown to not always pay off. e > On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:43, Eric Voskuil <[email protected]> wrote: > > For some definitions of “block”. > > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are off on a > chain split. Anyone can of course split off from a chain by changing a rule > (soft or otherwise) at any time, so this is a bit of an empty claim. > > Nobody can stop a person from splitting. The relevant question is how to > *prevent* a split. And activation without majority hash power certainly does > not “ensure” this. > > e > >> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:13, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> BIP8 LOT=True just ensures miners cannot block an upgrade entirely. They >> can >> still slow it down. >> >> It also already has the trinary state you seem to be describing (although >> perhaps this could be better documented in the BIP): users who oppose the >> softfork can and should treat the successful signal (whether MASF or UASF) >> as >> invalid, thereby ensuring they do not follow a chain with the rules in force. >> >> No additional bit is needed, as softforks are coordinated between users, NOT >> miners (who have no particular say in them, aside from their role as also >> being users). The miner involvement is only out of necessity (to set the bit >> in the header, which users coordinate with) and potentially to accelerate >> activation by protecting upgrade-lagging users. >> >> Luke >> >> >>>> On Saturday 26 June 2021 20:21:52 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>> Given the recent controversy over upgrade mechanisms for the >>> non-controversial taproot upgrade, I have been thinking about ways to solve >>> the problems that both sides brought up. In short, BIP8 LOT=true proponents >>> make the point that lazy miners failing to upgrade in a timely manner slow >>> down releases of bitcoin upgrades, and BIP9 / BIP8 LOT=false >>> proponents make the point that LOT=true can lead to undesirable forks that >>> might cause a lot of chaos. I believe both points are essentially correct >>> and have created a proposal >>> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-trinary-version-signaling/blob/master/b >>> ip-trinary-version-bits.md> for soft fork upgrades that solve both problems. >>> >>> The proposal uses trinary version signaling rather than binary signaling. >>> For any particular prospective soft fork upgrade, this allows for three >>> signaling states: >>> >>> * Actively support the change. >>> * Actively oppose the change. >>> * Not signaling (neither support or oppose). This is the default state. >>> >>> Using this additional information, we can release non-contentious upgrades >>> much quicker (with a much lower percent of miners signaling support). For >>> contentious upgrades, miners who oppose the change are incentivized to >>> update their software to a version that can actively signal opposition to >>> the change. The more opposition there is, the higher the threshold >>> necessary to lock in the upgrade. With the parameters I currently >>> recommended in the proposal, this chart shows how much support signaling >>> would be necessary given a particular amount of active opposition >>> signaling: >>> >>> [image: thresholdChart.png] >>> If literally no one signals opposition, a 60% threshold should be >>> relatively safe because it is a supermajority amount that is unlikely to >>> change significantly very quickly (ie if 60% of miners support the change >>> today, its unlikely that less than a majority of miners would support the >>> change a year or two from now), and if no one is signaling opposition, >>> chances are that the vast majority of the other 40% would also eventually >>> signal support. >>> >>> This both gives an incentive for "lazy" miners to upgrade if they actually >>> oppose the change while at the same time allowing these lazy miners to >>> remain lazy without slowing down the soft fork activation much. >>> >>> I think now is the right time to discuss new soft fork upgrade mechanisms, >>> when there are no pressing soft fork upgrades ready to deploy. Waiting >>> until we need to deploy a soft fork to discuss this will only delay things >>> and cause contention again like it did with taproot. >>> >>> I'm very curious to know what people think of this mechanism. I would >>> appreciate any comments here, or written as github issues on the proposal >>> repo itself. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> BT >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
