Good morning John, et al,
> > As has been pointed out by may others before, full RBF is aligned with > > miner (and user) economic incentives > > > This is a theory, not a fact. I can refute this theory by pointing out > several aspects: > 1. RBF is actually a fee-minimization feature that allows users to game the > system to spend the *least* amount in fees that correlates to their > time-preference. Miners earn less when fees can be minimized (obviously). > This feature also comes at an expense (albeit small) to nodes providing > replacement service and propagation. It is helpful to remember that the fees are a price on confirmation. And in economics, there is a "price theory": * As price goes down, demand goes up. * As price goes up, net-earning-per-unit goes up. The combination of both forces causes a curve where *total* earnings vs price has a peak somewhere, an "optimum price", and that peak is *unlikely* to be at the maximum possible price you might deem reasonable. And this optimum price may very well be *lower* than the prevailing market price of a good. Thus, saying "RBF is actually a fee-minimization feature" neglects the economics of the situation. If more people could use RBF onchain, more people would use Bitcoin and increase the value to miners. Rather than a fee-minimization feature, RBF is really an optimization to *speed up* the discovery of the optimum price, and is thus desirable. Unfortunately many 0-conf acceptors outright reject opt-in-RBF, despite the improved discovery of the optimum price, and thus there is a need for full-RBF to improve price discovery of blockspace when such acceptors are too prevalent. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
