On 31 Dec 2022, at 10:28 am, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev 
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
>> This way:
>> 
>> 1. system cannot be played
>> 2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of 
>> network security
> 
> The immediate danger we have with halvings is that in a competitive market,
> profit margins tend towards marginal costs - the cost to produce an additional
> unit of production - rather than total costs - the cost necessary to recover
> prior and future expenses. Since the halving is a sudden shock to the system,
> under the right conditions we could have a significant amount of hashing power
> just barely able to afford to hash prior to the halving, resulting in all that
> hashing power immediately having to shut down and fees increasing 
> dramatically,
> and likely, chaotically.  Your proposal does not address that problem as it 
> can
> only measure difficulty prior to the halving point.


> ... Since the halving is a sudden shock to the system

Is it though? Since everyone knows of the possible outcomes, wouldn't a 
possible halving be priced in? 

> resulting in all that hashing power immediately having to shut down and fees 
> increasing dramatically

Which should cause that hashing power to come back because of this fee 
increases.

Alfie

--
Alfie John
https://www.alfie <https://www.alfie/>.wtf
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