On May 8, 2023 at 1:16:41 PM, Moth via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> From what I understand, things like inscriptions can only be inserted > between two specific flags - OP_FALSE and OP_IF. Having a validation check > to reject witness scripts that have arbitrary data between these two flags > could be used to reject inscriptions while still allowing all the benefits > of taproot. This will prevent people from overloading the network with txns > geared solely for ordinals and brc-20 tokens. > Unfortunately, there are many other ways to “inscribe” other than that particular trick. > > Is there a reason such a validation check is a bad idea? We already have > OP_RETURN to store arbitrary data that is limited to 80kb. Was it an > oversight that arbitrary data can be inserted between OP_FALSE and OP_IF > when the size limit for witness scripts was lifted as part of taproot? > There have been some of us that had hoped for a slightly larger OP_RETURN such that we can store a tagged root of a hash-tree (~128-512 bytes). For instance, open time-stamps, ION, and my own privacy-focused Gordian Envelope (https://www.blockchaincommons.com/introduction/Envelope-Intro/), all consolidate large sets of proofs into a hash, which we use for L2 proofs-of-inclusion. My own preference is that the size can be large enough so you can store the hash, optionally have a signature on it, and have a few bytes for self-describing data (we like CBOR as it is quite small). All of us held off for years asking for larger OP_RETURN or standardizing on a pay-to-contract BIP for the techniques we do use because of objections to putting anything on-chain. But now we are dismayed by the inscription technique that freeloads on the network mempool, the validation network, and volunteer unpruned full nodes. For instance, I host an alternative explora instance (the source code base used by blockstream.info), offering it publicly via Tor so that there is more than a single server offering its details. Inscriptions combined with DOS attacks on Tor is making it more expensive for me to host and maintain this free privacy service. There was a recent thread discussing raising the limit on OP_RETURN https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27043 Here is an old relevant thread from open time-stamps: https://github.com/opentimestamps/python-opentimestamps/pull/14 I’m not sure what the solution is. I feel like I’ve been a good neighbor for some time on this topic, always recommending minimal on-chain data, and now I feel frustrated with this free-rider problem. — Christopher Allen
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