> Cool design. It seems resilient to many attacks. A Sybil attack > coming from a large botnet (which controls addresses in many ranges) > can still fill all buckets in both tables, I think. As far as I can > tell, that wasn't possible with the old design.
Given the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely / difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an attacker would have to control to have a (say) 1% chance of a successful Sybil attack? I like this change; I'd like to pull it for the 0.6 release. I've also been wondering if it is time to remove the IRC bootstrapping mechanism; it would remove a fair bit of code and we'd stop getting reports that various ISPs tag bitcoin as malware. When testing the list of built-in bootstrapping IP addresses I always connect fairly quickly, and the DNS seeding hosts seems to be working nicely, too. -- -- Gavin Andresen ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Keep Your Developer Skills Current with LearnDevNow! The most comprehensive online learning library for Microsoft developers is just $99.99! Visual Studio, SharePoint, SQL - plus HTML5, CSS3, MVC3, Metro Style Apps, more. Free future releases when you subscribe now! http://p.sf.net/sfu/learndevnow-d2d _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
