On Thu, Mar 07, 2013 at 06:00:18AM -0500, Peter Todd wrote: > It's also notably that auditable off-chain transaction systems are > vulnerable. All of the trustworthy ones that don't rely on trusted > hardware require at least some of their on-chain transactions to be > publicly known, specifically so that the total amount of reserves held > by off-chain transaction providers can be audited. At best you can use > Gregory Maxwell's suggestion of maintaining a "reserve" account backed > by funds that rarely move, where new deposits go to non-public addresses > and result in the depositor receiving funds from the reserve account, > but again, if the spendability of those funds is in question, the value > of the reserve itself is also in question. Additionally miners can block > fidelity bond sacrifice transactions easily; again a critical > technologies required to implement some types of off-chain transaction > systems, as well as for many other purposes.
Oh, and it occured to me: merge-mining is also vulnerable to the exact same censorship forces. Again, with small blocks running P2Pool is feasible, and P2Pool does merge-mining just fine. With large blocks it's easy for the pool to ignore shares that try to merge mine, so your alt-chains competition is also censored. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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