On Thu, Apr 18, 2013 at 05:04:44AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote: > An attack still shuts down useful tx replacement though. For instance in > the adjusting payments example an attacker sets up a legit adjusting > payment channel, does a bunch of adjustments, and then launches their > attack. They broadcast enough adjustments that their adjustment session > looks like part of an attack, and then don't have to pay for the full > adjusted amount.
...and actually, that's not a problem if the defender is online, because they can just broadcast the highest sequence numbered tx, which blocks further broadcasts by the attacker. You still need some way of distinguishing the two acts, by time is probably fine, but it'd make a real attack difficult. Of course, regardless you are still asking nodes to set aside however many KB/second to tx replacement transactions, and they're all going to use different settings, which makes overall network convergence impossible to guarantee as legit replacement transactions outnumber non-legit ones. Any protocol requiring the broadcast of more than one or two replacements, either normally or against an attacker, just isn't going to be reliable. But many don't, so they're probably doable. But lets see some working code first... -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Precog is a next-generation analytics platform capable of advanced analytics on semi-structured data. The platform includes APIs for building apps and a phenomenal toolset for data science. Developers can use our toolset for easy data analysis & visualization. Get a free account! http://www2.precog.com/precogplatform/slashdotnewsletter
_______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
