On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 12:10:38PM +0100, Adam Back wrote: > Might leak less wiggle room and be simpler/more robut to validate that > *everything* has to be the same except for the amount going to one (presumed > change) address. A privacy leak I know, but dont do that - ie send enough > change the first time. And network analysis has shown change addresses > arent adding hardly any privacy. > > We need more robust privacy fixes independently. I do not support damaging > the 0-conf feature, so I think this later approach is a better track for > revising fees.
There's been a number of uses found for tx-replacement beyond simply modifying fees. In additition, allowing for the value of a specificly designated change address to be changed after the fact is not compatible with current zero-conf-using implementations; they don't know to treat a txout as special so allowing its value to be reduced would allow for a zeroconf attack. Anyway, if you look at the code that actually implements the replacement, it's extremely simple already. I see no reason to make it less general; transaction relaying rules are not part of consensus. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 000000000000000a6dd96c551eca7299463e4e523462798a006535f412b519c7
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