Sorry to run on, a correction is needed. A much better approximation requires that the rule-following minority finds the next TWO blocks, so the cost is
(total miner revenue of block)*(fraction of hashpower following the rule)^2 So the lower bound cost in this very pessimistic scenario is .0025 BTC, still quite high for one transaction. I guess miner could try to make a business out of mining double-spends, to defray that cost. On 5/11/2014 9:41 PM, Tom Harding wrote: > Back up to the miner who decided to include a "seasoned" double-spend > in his block. Let's say he saw it 21 seconds after he saw an earlier > spend, and included it, despite the rule. > > The expected cost of including the respend is any revenue loss from > doing so: (total miner revenue of block)*(fraction of hashpower > following the rule). So today, if only 1% of hashpower follows the > rule (ie a near total failure of consensus implementation), he still > loses at least .25 BTC. > > .25 BTC is about 1000x the typical "double-spend premium" I'm seeing > right now. Wouldn't the greedy-rational miner just decide to include > the earlier spend instead ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Accelerate Dev Cycles with Automated Cross-Browser Testing - For FREE Instantly run your Selenium tests across 300+ browser/OS combos. Get unparalleled scalability from the best Selenium testing platform available Simple to use. Nothing to install. Get started now for free." http://p.sf.net/sfu/SauceLabs _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
