I created the title using Chrome Status's deprecation template, so any confusion should be blamed on that.
I used the "Draft Intent to Deprecate and Remove email" button, and assume I'd need to do a "Draft Intent to Ship email" before shipping to stable, after a 50% trial on prerelease channels. On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 3:15 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:36 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 5:23 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:18 PM Matt Menke <mme...@google.com> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 4:53 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 8:47 PM 'Matt Menke' via blink-dev < >>>>> blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Contact emailsmme...@google.com >>>>>> >>>>>> ExplainerNone >>>>>> >>>>>> Specificationhttps://url.spec.whatwg.org/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Summary >>>>>> >>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end in numbers >>>>>> are treated as valid, and looked up via DNS (e.g., http://foo.127.1/). >>>>>> Per the Public Suffix List spec, the eTLD+1 of the hostname in that URL >>>>>> should be "127.1". If that is ever fed back into a URLs, " >>>>>> http://127.1/ <http://127.0.0.1/>" is mapped to "http://127.0.0.1/"; >>>>>> by the URL spec, which seems potentially dangerous. "127.0.0.0.1" could >>>>>> also potentially be used to confuse users. We want to reject URLs with >>>>>> these hostnames. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Blink componentInternals>Network>DNS >>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3EDNS> >>>>>> >>>>>> Motivation >>>>>> >>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end in numbers >>>>>> are treated as valid hostnames, and looked up via DNS. Example hostnames: >>>>>> 127.0.0.0.1, foo.0.1, 10.0.0.09, 08.1.2.3. These can be problematic for >>>>>> the >>>>>> following reason: * "http://foo.127.1/"; has an eTLD+1 of "127.1", >>>>>> per the public suffix list spec. If that's ever used as the hostname in a >>>>>> new URL, however, as in "http://127.1 <http://127.0.0.1/>", it will >>>>>> then get mapped to "http://127.0.0.1/";, per the URL spec, which is a >>>>>> different host, which is not safe. * "http://127.0.0.0.1"; and " >>>>>> http://1.2.3.09";, both of which are looked up via DNS rather than >>>>>> failing or being treated as IPv4 hostnames, also seem potentially >>>>>> confusing. While no exploit is currently known here, we want to remove >>>>>> support for these as a preventative security measure. The URL spec has >>>>>> been >>>>>> updated so that any URL with a hostname ending in a number that's not an >>>>>> IPv4 address (including, e.g., http://foo.1./, but not >>>>>> http://foo.1../) is considered invalid. Since this is part of the >>>>>> URL spec, not the DNS spec, we want to reject these URLs are the GURL >>>>>> layer, for URLs with appropriate protocols (http, https, ws, wss, file). >>>>>> For consistency, we should also fail DNS lookup attempts of these sorts >>>>>> of >>>>>> hostnames. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Initial public proposalhttps://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619 >>>>>> >>>>>> TAG reviewNot required for an Intent to Deprecate, I believe. >>>>>> >>>>>> TAG review statusNot applicable >>>>>> >>>>>> Risks >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>> >>>>>> Any URL with an affected hostname will fail to load, and will need to >>>>>> be migrated to another hostname. URLs of this form do appear to be in >>>>>> use, >>>>>> though it's not clear under what circumstances. No entry in the public >>>>>> suffix list is affected. Affected URLs make up no more than 0.0003% of >>>>>> hostnames looked up via the host resolver on any platform, and are >>>>>> basically not used in any file URLs, according to our metrics. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Do we have reason to believe these hostnames are not legitimate ones? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Unfortunately, we have no insight into them - they could be mistyped >>>> URLs sent to typo squatting ISPs that OSX lets through but the Windows host >>>> resolver blocks, and various flavors of Linux treat differently. Or they >>>> could be mapped via a hosts file, or they could be hostnames that only >>>> resolve on public networks. Could be some network tool that uses them when >>>> installed locally, but is only available on certain platforms. No reason >>>> to think one possibility is more likely than the others. >>>> >>> >>> Do we have UKM for them that would enable us to test a random sample? >>> I'm concerned about blocking those hostnames if they are legitimate, as >>> that's something that a web developer can't do anything about. >>> So even if the number of hosts is small, I'd like to get more certainty >>> that they are *not* legitimate hosts before blocking them. >>> >> >> We have UKM on their number (0.0003% of DNS lookups on OSX, less >> elsewhere - we can't meaningfully instrument percent of created GURLs), but >> we don't have their hostnames, what they resolve to, or know anything else >> about them, unfortunately. >> >> Navigation to a subset of these as frame URLs were broken at one point - >> I'm pretty sure the breakage even made it to stable: >> https://crbug.com/1173238. There were no reports of problems. Only >> non-IPv4 URLs where the last two components were broken, though, and it >> didn't affect subresources. On OSX and Android, over 99% of successfully >> resolved problematic hostnames fit into that bucket, though on Linux, only >> about 2% do. >> >> That doesn't give us any hard conclusions, except they're either not >> deliberate navigations on OSX/Android, or they're not navigations. >> > > :| > > One more question: Is this an intent to Prototype or an intent to > deprecate? The title is a bit unclear.. > >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On OSX and Android, about 90% of host resolver lookups for these >>>>>> hostnames succeed, 60% do on Linux, and 2% on Windows and ChromeOS. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Do you know where those failures are coming from? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Could be typos, could be the Windows and ChromeOS host resolvers don't >>>> let them through. Since we've had no filed bugs about them, I suspect the >>>> failures are not deliberate navigations or intended network requests. I'm >>>> much more interested in where the successes are coming from, myself. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> To allow for emergency disabling in case of wider than expected >>>>>> breakage, I intend to add a feature for it, and do a 50% field trial on >>>>>> pre-release channels, though plan to just enable the feature, rather than >>>>>> do a gradual rollout to stable, given the low usage. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Gecko: Positive ( >>>>>> https://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619#issuecomment-890826499 >>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/admin/features/launch/5679790780579840/1?intent=1> >>>>>> ) >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Can you file an official position request? >>>>> https://bit.ly/blink-signals >>>>> >>>> >>>> Done for Mozilla: >>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/568 >>>> >>>> Should I also do this for WebKit as well? They have in process CLs, so >>>> not sure if it's still needed. >>>> >>> >>> Agree that in-flight patches for WebKit are a sufficient positive signal. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> WebKit: In development ( >>>>>> https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=228826) >>>>>> >>>>>> Web developers: No signals >>>>>> >>>>>> Activation >>>>>> >>>>>> This breaks anything using one of these domains, and requires >>>>>> migrating to other hostnames. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Security >>>>>> >>>>>> None >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>> >>>>>> These will act like any other invalid URL. Behavior is context >>>>>> dependent. Since this is logic deep within GURL, and GURLs are created >>>>>> in a >>>>>> great many places, console warnings specifically for this seem not >>>>>> practical. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>> ?No. Javascript URL construction is tested, but URLs are used in a >>>>>> great many other places, which don't have test coverage, since DNS >>>>>> lookups >>>>>> for these domains must succeed in the first place for the tests to be >>>>>> meaningful. >>>>>> >>>>>> Flag name >>>>>> >>>>>> Requires code in //chrome?False >>>>>> >>>>>> Tracking bughttps://crbug.com/1237032 >>>>>> >>>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>>> DevTrial on desktop 95 >>>>>> DevTrial on Webview 95 >>>>>> >>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5679790780579840 >>>>>> >>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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