Hello,

I've noticed that the flag for this feature has recently been removed on 
107, and now this feature cannot be disabled anymore on chromium.

https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3372042

I would like to mention though that this feature seems to be a bit 
controversial. Both Brave 
(https://brave.com/web-standards-at-brave/6-privacy-sandbox-concerns/), and 
Mozilla 
(https://mozilla.github.io/standards-positions/#http-origin-signed-responses) 
have indicated objection to SXG. I understand that it is common policy to 
remove flags that are enabled by default after several releases. Having 
said that, I would appreciate if anyone could suggest what is the way 
forward. How do we intend to achieve consensus?

Regards,
Claudio.
On Monday, February 4, 2019 at 5:24:20 PM UTC PhistucK wrote:

> This is a bit of a specification question/suggestion, but it might help in 
> not being totally against this feature -
> What about requiring and reusing the Location HTTP response header? When 
> the Content-Type response header is of a signed exchange type, it will be 
> ignored by browsers that support signed exchange and non-supporting 
> browsers (or format mismatch) will simply redirect to the 
> non-signed-exchange version. Without Location, the signed exchange will 
> be ignored and result in a navigation error.
>
> One more alternative to make sure signed exchanges do not subset the Web 
> is to fetch the fallback URL in parallel certain percents of the signed 
> exchange responses (or once per origin per day) and compare the content. 
> 90% similarity will not trigger the no-fallback histogram.
>
> ☆*PhistucK*
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 4, 2019 at 5:40 PM 'Kouhei Ueno' via blink-dev <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Thank you for your valuable feedback.
>>
>> We just enabled 
>> <https://crrev.com/a91c1c2e859a783fcfb448883d758b6c5c823bbe> Signed HTTP 
>> Exchange by default on ToT. As Daniel mentioned, we believe this is the 
>> best way forward to gather broader feedback from users.
>>
>> Shipping a feature is not an end of our work by any means. We are fully 
>> committed to continue work in the space. Your feedback is highly welcomed 
>> at any stage.
>>
>> We will continue to seek support from other browser vendors. I highly 
>> appreciate the fact that other browser vendors are starting to engage in 
>> the WICG/webpackage <https://github.com/WICG/webpackage> repository.
>>
>> Especially given the current situation, we believe it is important to 
>> maintain the state where Signed HTTP Exchange is not required for any web 
>> content. This will not only avoid us subsetting the Web, but also allow us 
>> to make breaking changes to Signed HTTP Exchange and evolve. The 
>> fallbackUrl is one of our attempts to enforce this from spec.
>>
>> --
>>
>> kouhei
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 5, 2019 at 12:31 AM Rick Byers <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 4, 2019 at 8:12 AM Daniel Bratell <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> As Chris wrote, a lot of discussion went into the shipping decision so 
>>>> I  
>>>> want to document what made it a non-trivial decision from my point of 
>>>> view:
>>>>
>>>> This is changing the delivery model of the web. We can't predict 100% 
>>>> how  
>>>> it will evolve, but moving away from point-to-point distribution 
>>>> (which  
>>>> has been further enforced by https, but also weakened by CDN systems) 
>>>> to a  
>>>> model with distribution centers has the potential to change the power  
>>>> balance of the Internet. Is that a reason not to ship it? No. At least 
>>>> not  
>>>> in itself, but it makes it more important to get right.
>>>>
>>>> Security: The team seems to have done an awesome job collecting 
>>>> feedback  
>>>> and adapting the feature to alleviate any potential known security  
>>>> problems, but the change in delivery path opens up some new attack  
>>>> vectors. None that can't be protected against, but as developers lack  
>>>> experience with this, there is a certain risk they make mistakes.
>>>>
>>>> Cross platform: We want a distributed internet/web with multiple  
>>>> compatible implementations. As of today, no browser engine beyond 
>>>> Chromium  
>>>> has committed to implementing this and Mozilla has even labeled the 
>>>> whole  
>>>> idea as "harmful". I believe that the team has addressed the technical  
>>>> arguments from other browser vendors and I hope Mozilla would change 
>>>> their  
>>>> mind if they took a new look, but it remains a fact that this feature 
>>>> will  
>>>> not initially be cross browser.
>>>>
>>>> For a user, best case, there is no visible difference between a 
>>>> resource  
>>>> delivered from the original site and a resource delivered from a  
>>>> SXG-proxy, but worst case a site might decide to only provide SXG  
>>>> resources. That would be incredibly bad. If Chromium can do something 
>>>> to  
>>>> make such a decision a non-option, that would be good.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is a good point. Perhaps we could consider, for example, having a 
>>> 1% hold-out where some users don't get SXG support. This is problematic 
>>> mainly because it causes confusion for developers trying to compare 
>>> performance or diagnose issues. Generally we keep observable platform 
>>> behavior experiments to dev and beta channels, but that probably would not 
>>> be a sufficient population to motivate anyone to avoid depending on it.
>>>
>>> But fallback URLs <https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/issues/242> are 
>>> already required for publishers to avoid being impacted by expected format 
>>> breaking changes (which I'm sure we will have). So even in the worst case 
>>> that some server is mis-configured to ignore the Accept header and always 
>>> serve an SXG (eg. perhaps based on User-Agent string), it should be trivial 
>>> and reliable to pull out the fallback URL and navigate to that.
>>>
>>> I propose that we keep our eyes out for any experience getting worse 
>>> than today in browsers without signed exchange support, and if we see 
>>> evidence of this happening at scale, pull signed exchange support back from 
>>> some fraction of Chrome users. Exactly how best to do this will depend on 
>>> the situation. But it could even include, for example, having a period of a 
>>> week where 50% of Chrome users have SXG support disabled. Or perhaps we 
>>> could even disable support for specific origins which a crawler 
>>> algorithmically identifies as lacking proper fallback support (after 
>>> attempting to reach out to the owners of those origins of course).
>>>
>>> Anyway there are lots of options here. So I'm confident there's no need 
>>> to be further delayed by fear over what bad things might happen. Instead we 
>>> can try to agree and publicly commit to the outcome we all want (i.e. the 
>>> web continues to work as well as it does today in browsers without SXG, 
>>> works better for users and publishers in browsers that have SXG support, 
>>> and SXG is on a reasonable path to eventually be supported by multiple 
>>> engines). Then when (I say "when", because at some scale some amount is 
>>> inevitable) there is concrete evidence that part of the web ecosystem is 
>>> moving in a direction against the goals of the web packaging effort, we can 
>>> deploy mitigations (up to and including disabling support entirely if 
>>> necessary).
>>>
>>> Some support for a feature from other browser vendors is a key factor 
>>>> when  
>>>> we decide whether to ship a feature, but at some time we have to 
>>>> determine  
>>>> that the Chromium development team has done everything reasonable to 
>>>> get  
>>>> others onboard despite nobody else supporting it and that is the case  
>>>> here. Then the question becomes if this is valuable enough to ship 
>>>> anyway.
>>>>
>>>> User feedback: Will this be used? Is this solving a problem? We did  
>>>> request feedback from the experiment, and we got some. All in all it 
>>>> seems  
>>>> to solve an important problem for CDNs and similar parties, a problem 
>>>> that  
>>>> has really weak work-arounds today. Does it solve a problem for 
>>>> end-users  
>>>> or web developers? Well, it's supposed to be invisible for end-users, 
>>>> and  
>>>> the problem it solves for web developers mostly has to do with  
>>>> distribution. It might unlock better page load performance due to a 
>>>> better  
>>>> CDN experience and that is something users and web developers usually 
>>>> like.
>>>>
>>>> Given all of the above, I think shipping is the way to go (lgtm4), but  
>>>> also that the effort to get other vendors onboard needs to continue.
>>>>
>>>> Anne asked about running an experiment instead of shipping. An 
>>>> experiment  
>>>> has been running for a couple of months and it seems to have produced  
>>>> positive results but given the investment required to use this feature, 
>>>> I  
>>>> think the feature has to be backed by a longer term commitment 
>>>> (shipping)  
>>>> before we can get more feedback.
>>>>
>>>
>>> +1. Let's not forget that it's been 1.5 years since the W3C Tag issued 
>>> their finding 
>>> <https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/distributed-content/#recommendations> 
>>> encouraging 
>>> the development of web packaging (shortly after which Google started 
>>> serious investments including driving more active discussion in standards 
>>> groups and landing code), and 5 years since the TAG first started 
>>> driving exploration of the space 
>>> <https://github.com/w3ctag/packaging-on-the-web>. As for any change of 
>>> this magnitude to the architecture of the web, I'm sure it'll continue to 
>>> be somewhat "experimental" for the next 5 years. But any meaningful 
>>> experiment with aspirations of succeeding in under a decade end-to-end 
>>> requires making it available by default at some point in the middle 
>>> (especially in cases like this where we have confidence that we could 
>>> safely drop support without significant user harm if results indicate the 
>>> experiment is a failure).
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>> /Daniel
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, 04 Feb 2019 10:48:39 +0100, Anne van Kesteren <[email protected]>  
>>>>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > On Fri, Feb 1, 2019 at 11:28 PM Mike West <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> >> With those mitigations in mind, we should ship some running code, 
>>>> and  
>>>> >> continue working towards rough consensus with other vendors as we 
>>>> learn  
>>>> >> together from that implementation experience.
>>>> >
>>>> > To be clear, there's only running code. There's no rough consensus or
>>>> > an accepted web standard. If what you want is implementation
>>>> > experience, why not make this an experiment for a while?
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> /* Opera Software, Linköping, Sweden: CET (UTC+1) */
>>>>
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>>>>
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