I'd be supportive of a coordinated change, given that popular 3P outreach was successful, and 1P use is unlikely to result in user visible breakage. What's the timeline you have in mind? What's the outreach plan to make developers aware of this upcoming change?
On Tuesday, May 16, 2023 at 7:03:34 PM UTC+2 vis...@google.com wrote: > Yes, I've got a positive response from the two 3P APIs (relatively > popular). One case is already solved and in production, the second one, > responsible for a huge increase on the UKM entries from February - March is > solved and testing right now. > > However, I believe we still want to coordinate the launch with other > browsers. Discussions are ongoing in this sense, and so far Firefox > confirmed they are in a similar situation, code complete and ready to ship > if / when we are. > > On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 10:57 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> Hi Javier, >> >> On 4/5/23 5:54 AM, Javier Garcia Visiedo wrote: >> >> For these visual elements, are there any common threads that you could >>> notice? E.g. Any common 3P providers? >>> >> >> In all cases I've seen, these are 1P requests of the form >> https://foo.example to https://api.foo.example/api/v1/blah. I've not >> found many sites with these visual element impacts, so I've been trying >> to contact them. So far with no luck. >> >> I guess the same question also applies to the non-visual breakage. (you >>> mentioned analytics and personalization providers) >> >> >> These account for the majority of the cases I found, and all but 2 of >> them are 1P. >> >> I have identified two cases of 3P which are quite relevant, and have just >> made contact with them. I will provide an update once I receive feedback. >> >> Any luck hearing back from these sites? >> >> >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 1:35 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 11:01 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 10:32 AM Javier Garcia Visiedo < >>>> visi...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thank you for your quick reply Yoav, >>>>> >>>>> Please find my answers inline. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, March 29, 2023 at 4:35:32 PM UTC+9 Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thank you so much, Javier! :) That's some great analysis! >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 7:51 AM Javier Garcia Visiedo < >>>>> visi...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> Please find the summary of my findings, after analyzing the UKM data. >>>>> >>>>> Currently, the UKM data shows 2,087 distinct domains (eTLD+1) sending >>>>> a wildcard for ACAH and/or ACAO in response to a credentialled request. >>>>> The >>>>> UKM data is not good at showing events over time, but the use counter >>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3873> >>>>> indicates the feature use is currently at 0.12% of total page loads, and >>>>> the monthly average of page loads has been steadily increasing since the >>>>> introduction of the use counter. >>>>> >>>>> Out of the 2,087 domains found in the UKM, the top one accounts for >>>>> 39.24% of the total navigations in the UKM (54% within top 20 sites), >>>>> using >>>>> this feature. The user experience is not visibly impacted for this site, >>>>> as >>>>> CORS is blocking calls to a publisher.Ads are displayed properly, so >>>>> apparently the blocked calls are impacting some kind of targeted ads API. >>>>> This site came into the data set for the first time in March 2023, and >>>>> it’s >>>>> very popular, so we expect to observe a big bump on the use counter from >>>>> now on. This site is an outlier in terms of traffic volume, compared to >>>>> other sites present in the UKM, and given the lack of Ux impact we >>>>> decided >>>>> to exclude it from the analysis presented below, to get a better >>>>> representation for the rest of the sites. >>>>> >>>>> Excluding the top site, we tested the next top 20 domains in number of >>>>> navigations using this feature, accounting for 42% of the total >>>>> navigation >>>>> in the UKM. In addition to this, we sampled the long tail for 11 more >>>>> sites >>>>> randomly, for an additional 3,4% of the total navigation in the UKM. >>>>> >>>>> Extrapolating data from the sampling, we classified sites in the >>>>> following categories: >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> No Ux impact: 94.85% of the navigations are free from visible user >>>>> experience impacts. In most cases, CORS policy is blocking calls to >>>>> personalization or analytics APIs. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "CORS policy" here refers to the status quo before this feature ships? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, these calls are blocked when activating the feature >>>>> >>>> >>>> Oh, ok. So these may have invisible breakage, that results in some >>>> ancillary service failure, but that users are unlikely to notice. >>>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> Impact to critical functionality, overall experience, log-in, >>>>> etc.: 2.6% >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> Impact to ancillary elements being blocked by CORS policy, such as >>>>> ads or widgets not essential to the overall page functionality: 2.55% >>>>> >>>>> Putting these numbers in context of the total page loads reported by >>>>> the use counter, 0,0062% of the total page loads experience some UX >>>>> regression due to the introduction of this feature. Of these, 0,0031% was >>>>> unusable. >>>>> >>>>> We reached out to the site owners with Ux impacts, and we were able to >>>>> confirm that 100% of the sites identified to have critical impact have >>>>> already migrated out of this feature. >>>>> >>>>> That's a bit higher than what we're typically comfortable with, but >>>>> it's great to hear that sites you reach out to react quickly. >>>>> How much of that impact was in the top 20 (where we can reasonably >>>>> reach out) vs. the long tail (where it'd be significantly harder to >>>>> communicate things beyond deprecation logs and reports)? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For sites with high impact (already addressed) 100% were found in the >>>>> top 20. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's very reassuring, thanks! >>>> >>>> >>>>> For sites where some visual elements are blocked, 55% (1.48% of total >>>>> navigations registered in the UKM for this feature) are part of the top >>>>> 20, >>>>> 45% in the long tail, with 1.07% of total navigations in the UKM. >>>>> >>>> >>> For these visual elements, are there any common threads that you could >>> notice? E.g. Any common 3P providers? >>> I guess the same question also applies to the non-visual breakage. (you >>> mentioned analytics and personalization providers) >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Happy to further clarify the data if needed. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks >>>>> Javier >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, July 13, 2022 at 2:49:30 PM UTC+9 Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hey Javier! >>>>> >>>>> The benefits of UKM is that it can give us a list of URLs that have >>>>> some breakage potential. The laternative is to cross the usecounter with >>>>> HTTPArchive data, but that has a strong bias towards homepages, so may >>>>> miss >>>>> a lot of pages that require a login and are not the homepage. With a more >>>>> accurate list of URLs, we'd be able to better assess the usage and >>>>> potential breakage. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers :) >>>>> Yoav >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jul 13, 2022 at 3:52 AM Javier Garcia Visiedo < >>>>> visi...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> I am starting a UKM collection review to opt in the existing use >>>>> counter >>>>> <https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3873> >>>>> into an UKM. Sorry if my question is too naive, I just wanted to >>>>> understand >>>>> what benefits would the UKM add over the existing use counter? Or is it >>>>> the >>>>> intention to add additional metrics to it? Thanks! >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Javier >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 27, 2022 at 1:33:19 AM UTC+9 Chris Harrelson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi, just checking in on this intent. From the API owners' perspective, >>>>> we're going to wait for the UKM, thanks. >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 12, 2022 at 7:41 AM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Yoav, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for the suggestions. I'll try to add UKM. >>>>> >>>>> > One other question that came up: Is the usage related to developers >>>>> adding the "Authorization" header on their own, or is it something the >>>>> browser sends under certain circumstances? (e.g. when receiving 401 >>>>> responses with "WWW-Autenticate" headers) >>>>> >>>>> This is only for authorization headers set by scripts (via fetch() and >>>>> XHR). Authorization headers the browser attaches are out of scope. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Jan 6, 2022 at 2:15 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hey Yutaka! >>>>> >>>>> We discussed this at the API owners meeting today (Daniel, Chris, >>>>> Alex, MikeT and myself). >>>>> It seems like the risk here is too high to remove support as is, and a >>>>> reasonable next step may be to add the metric to UKM and get a more >>>>> detailed view of which sites are using it and how. That would enable us >>>>> to >>>>> better assess breakage, and reach out to those sites to reduce current >>>>> usage until potential breakage reaches acceptable levels. >>>>> >>>>> One other question that came up: Is the usage related to developers >>>>> adding the "Authorization" header on their own, or is it something the >>>>> browser sends under certain circumstances? (e.g. when receiving 401 >>>>> responses with "WWW-Autenticate" headers) >>>>> Would renaming the headers used in such authentication protocols be a >>>>> useful alternative to consider? I'm guessing that doing that would >>>>> require >>>>> server changes as well, so won't necessarily help with cases of existing >>>>> content, but may help to move newer auth flows to make safer CORS choices. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers :) >>>>> Yoav >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, December 9, 2021 at 12:17:40 PM UTC+1 Yutaka Hirano wrote: >>>>> >>>>> We've been showing a deprecation message since 94 >>>>> <https://chromiumdash.appspot.com/commit/9a817d69a132822ddf2954120e96a3efa2290071>. >>>>> >>>>> Sadly the deprecation message hasn't decreased the usage so far. >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 9, 2021 at 1:52 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> From my perspective, it's a bit worrying that you found user-visible >>>>> breakage in a random sampling of the otherwise small number of sites that >>>>> fall into this category. As Yoav suggested, there's some additional >>>>> likelihood that we're not seeing some breakage that requires sign-in. It >>>>> might be worthwhile to raise a deprecation warning for this behavior, and >>>>> remove it after giving developers some time to adjust, perhaps with an >>>>> enterprise policy for good measure. I'd be happy with a 3-release >>>>> timeline, >>>>> with removal thereafter. That might drive the usage down to the point >>>>> where >>>>> we can reasonably remove it. If it doesn't, we might need to do some more >>>>> research (wiring this counter up to UKM, for instance) to see if we can >>>>> track down more clear sources of potential breakage. >>>>> >>>>> -mike >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, December 2, 2021 at 6:56:40 AM UTC+1 Yutaka Hirano wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 12:29 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 4:00 PM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Sorry for the delay! >>>>> >>>>> I checked 10 sites. I saw console errors in three sites among them: >>>>> 1. https://cchatty.com/ >>>>> 2. https://techrxiv.org/ >>>>> 3. https://bodyshake.com/ >>>>> >>>>> I only see a visible breakage in 1 (cards in the main panel are >>>>> invisible). On other sites I don't see any visible differences. >>>>> Please note that this feature is related to authorization so it is >>>>> likely to break things when signing in. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So it's possible that the breakage only occurs for logged in users, >>>>> and is not something you'd be able to see when spot checking their >>>>> homepage? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, I think so. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 8:11 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Friendly ping on Chris' question >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, November 4, 2021 at 8:31:36 PM UTC+1 Chris Harrelson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Would it be feasible to get a random list of 10-20 sites that hit the >>>>> use counter and see if they are broken badly by this feature? >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 4:54 AM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> (friendly ping) >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Nov 1, 2021 at 1:57 PM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for the feedback. >>>>> >>>>> Do you have concrete steps for the investigation in your mind? >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 4:30 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I think it's reasonable for us to dig into the data a little bit to >>>>> determine whether the 0.04% number quoted above will result in >>>>> user-facing >>>>> breakage. Yutaka, is that something you'd be willing to dig into? >>>>> >>>>> The direction seems philosophically correct to me, so I'd like to see >>>>> it ship, but I'd also like to make sure we're not making the web worse >>>>> for >>>>> users by doing so. >>>>> >>>>> -mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Oct 21, 2021 at 12:04 PM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Oct 21, 2021 at 6:25 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Oct 21, 2021 at 9:55 AM Yutaka Hirano <yhir...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> (The implementation CL >>>>> <https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3226283> >>>>> is under review. This intent is written as if it's landed.) >>>>> >>>>> Contact emailsyhir...@chromium.org >>>>> >>>>> Specificationhttps://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#cors-non-wildcard-request- >>>>> header-name >>>>> >>>>> Summary >>>>> >>>>> A CORS non-wildcard request header[1] is an HTTP request header which >>>>> is not covered by the wildcard symbol ("*") in the >>>>> access-control-allow-headers header. "authorization" is the only member >>>>> of >>>>> CORS non-wildcard request-header. Currently we treat the header as a >>>>> usual >>>>> header, which is problematic for security reasons. Implement it, and >>>>> change >>>>> the current behavior. 1: https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/ >>>>> #cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Blink componentBlink>SecurityFeature>CORS >>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS> >>>>> >>>>> TAG reviewNot needed because this implements an existing feature. >>>>> >>>>> TAG review statusNot applicable >>>>> >>>>> Risks >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>> >>>>> Interoperability risk is low because Mozilla and Apple showed an >>>>> intent to implement this behavior. There is some compatibility risk, as >>>>> the >>>>> use counter[2] shows 0.04% websites would be affected. To mitigate the >>>>> risk, we've shown a deprecation message for a few milestones. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Can you similarly send deprecation reports as well? How long have the >>>>> deprecation messages been in place? Did we see any decline in the numbers? >>>>> >>>>> We've shown the deprecation message since Chrome 94 >>>>> <https://chromiumdash.appspot.com/commit/9a817d69a132822ddf2954120e96a3efa2290071> >>>>> whose >>>>> beta promotion was on Aug 26 and stable release was on Sep 21. >>>>> We use CountDeprecation which sends deprecation reports automatically >>>>> IIUC. >>>>> >>>>> I don't see any decline. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Have we looked into which URLs are triggering this? (and if it's a few >>>>> medium-sized properties or many tiny ones) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I haven't looked at the data. >>>>> >>>>> Did we try outreach? >>>>> >>>>> No. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We have an enterprise policy so that administrators can keep the >>>>> existing behavior. We're planning to remove the policy on Chrome 103. 2: >>>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/popularity# >>>>> AuthorizationCoveredByWildcard >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gecko: Positive Firefox showed a positive signal in a private thread. >>>>> >>>>> WebKit: Positive Apple showed a positive signal in a private thread. >>>>> >>>>> Web developers: No signals >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Debuggability >>>>> >>>>> We'll show a CORS error to the devtools console. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>> ?Yes >>>>> >>>>> Flag nameCorsNonWildcardRequestHeadersSupport >>>>> >>>>> Requires code in //chrome?False (or, True only for the enterprise >>>>> policy.) >>>>> >>>>> Tracking bughttps://crbug.com/1176753 >>>>> >>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>> >>>>> 97 >>>>> >>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Statushttps://chromestatus.com/ >>>>> feature/5742041264816128 >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6G2mzUAH_Ghrqmb1xM7XetfKgB% >>>>> 3DMUkX0DED7yWbL4JfGg%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6G2mzUAH_Ghrqmb1xM7XetfKgB%3DMUkX0DED7yWbL4JfGg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6GB-CbbCqx0VHa7%3DLoZr%2BZN- >>>>> O7o7XwTGkxXEYQa9OfupQ%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6GB-CbbCqx0VHa7%3DLoZr%2BZN-O7o7XwTGkxXEYQa9OfupQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>> >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/ >>>>> chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6EqkidJF3mjfnztmMnKrEpb% >>>>> 3DPTvW-kpW0s_bWCM%3DOXY8A%40mail.gmail.com >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CABihn6EqkidJF3mjfnztmMnKrEpb%3DPTvW-kpW0s_bWCM%3DOXY8A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAMFgMgw_1WzXH6ewDJQk3bKrz%3DwdPzUp%2B7vRDKpMzeRK%2B43%3DUw%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAMFgMgw_1WzXH6ewDJQk3bKrz%3DwdPzUp%2B7vRDKpMzeRK%2B43%3DUw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/0333ba45-d1e2-8afe-0431-0d6254d794e0%40chromium.org >> >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/0333ba45-d1e2-8afe-0431-0d6254d794e0%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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