The change in milestones won't affect your approvals to ship. :)

On 2/9/24 6:24 AM, Jonathan Hao wrote:
I just realized that we can still make M123 so I plan to do so unless there are any objections.

On Thu, Feb 8, 2024 at 2:29 PM Jonathan Hao <p...@chromium.org> wrote:

    Here's a public version of the design doc:
    
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QyFqHCgZLmEfy0wbgXNgce9zKpZVaqSpQY3JleFWrk0/edit?usp=sharing

    On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 5:22 PM Daniel Bratell
    <bratel...@gmail.com> wrote:

        LGTM3 to add a warning.

        Normally we don't like open ended deprecation warnings, end,
        which this is, but this should be a rare warning, except
        possibly in enterprise situations, and even there, warnings
        might trigger some feedback from a group that is normally not
        aware of upcoming changes.

        /Daniel

        On 2024-02-07 14:40, Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) wrote:
        LGTM2

        On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 11:10 PM Mike Taylor
        <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote:

            Correction: LGTM1, conditioned on requesting Enterprise,
            Debuggability, and Testing bits in chromestatus. :)

            On 2/2/24 5:09 PM, Mike Taylor wrote:

            LGTM1

            On 2/2/24 11:17 AM, Jonathan Hao wrote:


                    Contact emails

            p...@chromium.org


                    Explainer

            
https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md


                    Specification

            https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access


                    Design docs


            
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UqkJsc2VZ4bXmZkVxh-EPyBFEtdxX9p2zX4sxzAj754/edit?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-7cfhrTo57AElxA6M9EVScg
            
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UqkJsc2VZ4bXmZkVxh-EPyBFEtdxX9p2zX4sxzAj754/edit?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-7cfhrTo57AElxA6M9EVScg>


                    Summary

            Before a website A navigates to another site B in the
            user's private network, this feature does the following:
            1. Checks whether the request has been initiated from a
            secure context
            2. Sends a preflight request, and checks whether B
            responds with a header that allows private network access.

            The above checks are made to protect the user's private
            network. There are already features for subresources
            and workers, but this one is for navigation requests
            specifically.


            Since this feature is the "warning-only" mode, we do
            not fail the requests if any of the checks fails. 
            Instead, a warning will be shown in the DevTools, to
            help developers prepare for the coming enforcement.



                    Blink component

            Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess
            
<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>


                    Motivation

            To prevent malicious websites from pivoting through the
            user agent's network position to attack devices and
            services which reasonably assumed they were unreachable
            from the Internet at large, by virtue of residing on
            the user’s local intranet or the user's machine.



                    Initial public proposal

            
https://discourse.wicg.io/t/transfer-cors-rfc1918-and-hsts-priming-to-wicg/1726


                    TAG review

            https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572


                    TAG review status

            Issues addressed


                    Risks



                    Interoperability and Compatibility

            Since we don't enforce the checks and only show
            warnings, there isn't any compatibility risks on the
            client side. On the server side, it shouldn't pose any
            risk either as the server can ignore the preflight
            requests.



            /Gecko/: Positive
            (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143)
            https://mozilla.github.io/standards-positions/#cors-and-rfc1918
            makes it a bit clearer that this is indeed positive (vs
            the issue).

            /WebKit/: Positive
            (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/163)
            Safari disagrees with the spec name and header names,
            but still overall positive.

            /Web developers/: Mixed signals Anecdotal evidence so
            far suggests that most web developers are OK with this
            new requirement, though some do not control the target
            endpoints and would be negatively impacted.

            /Other signals/:


                    Security

            This change aims to be security-positive, preventing
            CSRF attacks against soft and juicy targets such as
            router admin interfaces. DNS rebinding threats were of
            particular concern during the design of this feature:
            
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9



                    WebView application risks

            Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of
            existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk
            for Android WebView-based applications?

            None



                    Debuggability

            Relevant information (client and resource IP address
            space) is already piped into the DevTools network
            panel. Deprecation warnings and errors will be surfaced
            in the DevTools issues panel explaining the problem
            when it arises.



                    Is this feature fully tested by
                    web-platform-tests
                    
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>?

            Yes

            
https://wpt.fyi/results/fetch/private-network-access?q=fetch%2Fprivate-network-access&run_id=5090117631868928&run_id=6245938696814592&run_id=5769215446351872&run_id=5679819023974400
            
<https://wpt.fyi/results/fetch/private-network-access?q=fetch%2Fprivate-network-access&run_id=5090117631868928&run_id=6245938696814592&run_id=5769215446351872&run_id=5679819023974400>



                    Flag name on chrome://flags

            None


                    Finch feature name

            PrivateNetworkAccessForNavigations,
            PrivateNetworkAccessForNavigationsWarningOnly


                    Requires code in //chrome?

            False


                    Tracking bug

            https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1524350


                    Estimated milestones

            Shipping on desktop         124

            Shipping on Android         124



                    Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status

            https://chromestatus.com/feature/4869685172764672

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            Status <https://chromestatus.com/>.
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