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John Fraizer wrote:
> Carrier grade routers are designed to route (or switch in the case of > MPLS) packets at line-rate. When you start applying ACLs, the > performance hit is not trivial - especially when you've got interfaces > doing 1-Mpps+ under *normal* load. Alright, so let me start again... I stated if NAP's and NSP's contacted their customers lowly DS3 guys like me and stated "Look here is what you need to do to avoid having your network send out garbage...", imagine for a second if a fraction of NAP's started implementing these policies how much garbage traffic would be curtailed. > Go look and see how much a TMS costs. Now, consider a "medium" sided > provider with a backbone that covers about 25 states. How many TMS > devices does that provider need to deploy? How much extra capacity does > that provider need to deploy on their network to be able to divert > traffic to the "closest" TMS? And how much would it cost for the following: Dear Valued Customer, Beginning December 2007, we will be asking out customers to help make our networks more efficient. We ask that you view a set of pre-defined guidelines created by industry experts and implement them on your routers and switches. Should you need a assistance please contact us. Sincerely, Your Provider Working to make the Internet Safer. > I wasn't the one who went out and started talking smack on IRC and > invited Joe Botherder to "take his best shot" at me. It was my > misguided customer. Its that customer I know I wouldn't want on my network. Even if they did pay X over bandwidth I just wouldn't want them. > This notion that it is the responsibility of the > providers to protect their customers is analogous to the two of us > walking into a bar and you thinking that just because I'm a Marine that > you can go pick the biggest, baddest mofo in the bar and pick a fight > with him and it will be my job to fight him *for you*... Is it, I look at this analogy, you go to a car dealer say Nissan, purchase your car. Brake problems? I take it back to the dealer. "Oh my, did email or call me to say an attacker has the potential to affect the GPS and re-route my destination even stop me from getting there. Wow, and you even sent me instructions on how to avoid it." Know what, I'd appreciate that car dealer. I'd even go tell another Nissan owner, hey did you hear the news... > It exists. It's been around for quite some time. > > uRPF + RFC1998 > > And a newer concept: > > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-marques-idr-flow-spec-04.txt I meant to make mention of a lot of things. When I rambled on it was rambling on. It was to make a point, I'm sure there are tons of things a lowly provider can do maybe they're misguided as you say I am, maybe some just don't know about these things. How about guidance from the big boys. How about a template from the industry's experts. How about guidance from the big boys before its too late: http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=130745 I sincerely enjoy word for word the learning experience here so please don't misunderstand my communication at any given time and should you tell me to STFU I'd respect that too, but I'm trying to understand why it can't be done and sadly I'm still seeing nothing more then an excuse. Not from you per-se but overall there is STILL no reason why networks can't be cleaner. > The "bad guys" aren't just > 15-y/o zit-faced punks trying to impress their friends anymore. It is > organized crime, terrorists, rogue nations, etc. These people don't > have any more of a problem putting a bullet in your head than they do > sending a ping-flood your way. For that reason, among others, the > intelligence gathering and mitigation activities are conducted under the > cloak of secrecy. It's all about operational security. > Understandable as well and appreciated on the schooling I'm getting. ==================================================== J. Oquendo "Excusatio non petita, accusatio manifesta" http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xF684C42E sil . infiltrated @ net http://www.infiltrated.net
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