On Tue, 7 Sep 2004 23:13:36 +0100, William T Goodall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 7 Sep 2004, at 10:50 pm, Julia Randolph wrote: > > > http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78 (Article dated 8/26/04) > > > > Quote: > > > > By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set > > of votes > > is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no > > longer > > matches the correct votes. The voting system will then read > > the totals > > from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to change the > > votes, > > and to date not a single location in the U.S. has implemented > > security > > measures to fully mitigate the risks. > > > > This program is not "stupidity" or sloppiness. It was designed > > and > > tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments. > > > > I thought this might be of interest to some. > > > > " The GEMS program runs on a Microsoft Access database." > -- > William T Goodall
That was the most serious finding of the black box voting critics, there are actually three separate sets of books kept and vote totals used can be switched to another set and the audit tracking functions are turned off on ACCESS. You enter the two digit code, you change totals for a set of candidates - all you have to remember is to balance the numbers you add to one candidate to subtract from the other, and the new totals are now the official results. The ACCESS audit trial which records changes normal default of on is turned off on the GEM software. If desired you can do the changes at a higher level and all precinct totals or other lower totals are still correct, they just don't add to the total on the higher level changed. To spot this someone would have to manually, outside the vote counting software, add up all the lower levels and see if the answer is the same. To change a result would be a fast simple change to make at a high level but risks someone taking the time to add all of the precincts. Changing by precinct just takes longer. I wonder if some candidate would hire someone to total all the precincts and see if they match the machine results? Interesting design choice for the software. Because all the software code is secret it is also possible to put in an update patch that could perform an operation on the lowest levels - to add X votes to one candidate and take them away from another if the precinct total is above some value. The lack of media scrutiny and unwillingness to believe actual voters may not require the last bit. The companies are always sending in patches close to election day as bugs are discovered. There is no independent certification of the patches. An investigation in New Mexico revealed that one small county misprogrammed their machines in 2000 and the software did not record hundreds of votes. No one noticed at the time and later people thought it was fixed elsewhere. There was no fix, it could not be fixed. Individual votes are not recorded and so totals cannot be fixed. Down the sinkhole - over 600 votes. Vice President Al Gore won this state by 366 votes. Extremely few people were aware of the problem and the state elections office did not publicize it. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22536-2004Aug21.html Gary "wearing my election judge badge" Denton -- #2 on google for liberal news "I don't try harder" _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
