On 4/19/05, Robert J. Chassell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... > > A related issue: what, if anything, prevents this understanding of a > deity from being different than Tipler's suggestion that we are, > probabilistically speaking, a simulation running in an antiquarian > AI's supercomputer? > > After all, that entity's supercomputer is also necessary, else `all of > creation would come to a halt and we would cease to exist.' Moreover, > the antiquarian may, or may not, respond to prayers and/or works by > his simulations. And his purposes may be hard for a simulation to > figure out. > > -- > Robert J. Chassell
Wait, wasn't Tipler's argument basically given certain physical constraints, we would surely be re-incarnated at the end of the Universe? What you are mentioning sounds considerably more like Nick Bostrom's neat Simulation Argument. ~Maru _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
