> The future of s/key is probably what it always has been: an otp
> supplement [...] regardless of [] the access method
It's always seemed to me that s/key's biggest problem is that it's
*not* a true one-time password scheme: the passwords are
algorithmically related. Indeed, I believe it's no coincidence that
all the attacks against s/key (that I've heard of) are based on just
this weakness. It's very much like the difference between a
conventional stream cipher and a one-time pad, actually.
Of course, a true one-time password scheme (where "true" here means
that the passwords are truly random and completely unrelated) has its
own problems, mostly related to storing the passwords in question.
Personally, I generate passwords by rolling dice[%] and store them on a
small pad of paper (which I carry on my person when I travel) - not
entirely unlike a one-time pad. :-)
[%] And running the result through a simple hash function - more
precisely, I generate entropy by rolling dice and generate
passwords from that entropy by a simple encoding scheme.
der Mouse
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