On Sun, 13 Feb 2000, Darren Reed wrote:
> In some mail from Elias Levy, sie said:
> [...]
> > Network Ingress Filtering:
> > --------------------------
> >
> > All network access providers should implement network ingress filtering
> > to stop any of their downstream networks from injecting packets with
> > faked or "spoofed" addressed into the Internet.
> >
> > Although this does not stop an attack from occurring it does make it
> > much easier to track down the source of the attack and terminate it
> > quickly.
> >
> > For information on network ingress filtering read RFC 2267:
> > http://info.internet.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc/files/rfc2267.txt
>
> You know if anyone was of a mind to find someone at fault over this,
> I'd start pointing the finger at ISP's who haven't been doing this
> due to "performance reasons". They've had the ability to do it for
> years and in doing so would seriously reduce the number and possibility
> of "spoofing" attacks.
Well, I worked at such ISP. The issue was really simple: given the choice
between:
putting a Cisco 25xx for $x000 and hope that we can deal with the
problem when/if the customers start misbehaving, or
putting a Cisco 47xx for $x0000, and possibly never experience the
problem, but having spent awful lot of money
the decision to select the former had its firm economic ground, don't you
think?
Andrzej Bialecki
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