On Tue, 24 Apr 2001 20:13:30 +0930, "Donaldson, Matthew" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
said:
> (e.g. because it's non open-source). Having something like this gives them
> the security that even if someone is doing the Wrong Thing(tm), it does not
> put them at risk.
Puts them at much less risk. The risk is still non-zero. (Consider - does
the patch fix race conditions that happen to involve both /tmp *and* '..'
in the pathname? What *other* end conditions are there? Remember that
"non executable stack" patches don't stop all buffer overflows, they just
make them a LOT harder to exploit.....
--
Valdis Kletnieks
Operating Systems Analyst
Virginia Tech
- Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem Christoph Hellwig
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race probl... Christoph Hellwig
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race p... Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp r... Tollef Fog Heen
- Re: Linux patches to solve /t... Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Tollef Fog Heen
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Valdis Kletnieks
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Valdis Kletnieks
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Donaldson, Matthew
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Michal Zalewski
- Re: Linux patches to solve /t... Kurt Seifried
- Re: Linux patches to solv... Tollef Fog Heen
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp r... Crispin Cowan
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem Chris Wright
- Re: Linux patches to solve /tmp race problem Donaldson, Matthew
PGP signature