Ariel Waissbein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> There seems to be an typo in the following post. It is RSA and not DSA.
> The source, OpenSSL's webpage, has the same typo. Refer to
> http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2344
> (or http://www.core-sdi.com/advisories/ssh1_sessionkey_recovery.htm).
[...]
> Jim Knoble wrote:
> > This doesn't seem to have been announced here: OpenSSL-0.9.6a appears
> [snip]
> > - Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
>
> it should be Bleichenbacher's RSA attack and not DSA
Bleichenbacher did find a theoretical (but not very practical to
exploit) bias in the DSA recommended method of selecting k [1],
and that bias is fixed in OpenSSL-0.9.6a:
*) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack.
[1] http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/01/02/05/010205hndsa.xml
http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg04228.html
--
Dan Riley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Wilson Lab, Cornell University <URL:http://www.lns.cornell.edu/~dsr/>
"History teaches us that days like this are best spent in bed"
