On Wed, Jun 27, 2001 at 12:42:52AM +0200, Wichert Akkerman wrote:
> Previously Pavol Luptak wrote:
> > Linux kernels with openwall patch (with restricted links in /tmp) are
> > imunne to this type of attack (following symlinks does not work, link
> > owner does not match with file's owner).
>
> If symlink don't work you can still use a hardlink though.
Which is yet another reason for making /tmp a separate filesystem.
--
Linux Now! ..........Because friends don't let friends use Microsoft.
phil stracchino -- the renaissance man -- mystic zen biker geek
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2000 CBR929RR, 1991 VFR750F3 (foully murdered), 1986 VF500F (sold)
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability maniac
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Pavol Luptak
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerabi... Tomek Lipski
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerabi... Jarno Huuskonen
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... Pavol Luptak
- Re: smbd remote file creation v... Simple Nomad
- Re: smbd remote file creat... Olaf Kirch
- Re: smbd remote file c... Simple Nomad
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerabi... Wichert Akkerman
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... Michal Zalewski
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... Phil Stracchino
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... Steve Beattie
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerabi... Joachim Blaabjerg
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... Michal Zalewski
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulne... sarnold
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Fatal Connect
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Joseph Nicholas Yarbrough
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Christopher William Palow
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Dan Stromberg
- Re: smbd remote file creation vulnerability Daniel Jacobowitz
