-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________
OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenPKG-SA-2003.026 20-Mar-2003 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: openssl Vulnerability: information leakage OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT <= openssl-0.9.7a-20030317 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030320 OpenPKG 1.2 <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2 >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3 OpenPKG 1.1 <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2 >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3 Affected Releases: Dependent Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon w3m wget OpenPKG 1.2 apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget OpenPKG 1.1 apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m Description: According to an OpenSSL [0] security advisory [1], Czech cryptologists Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. The attack was documented in their report "Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS" [2]. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0147 [3] to the problem. Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS connections to the server under attack. The server's behaviour when faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key. Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too. [4][5] Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.*.rpm Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent packages (see above), too. [4][5] ________________________________________________________________________ References: [0] http://www.openssl.org/ [1] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030319.txt [2] http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/ [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0131 [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.3.src.rpm [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.3.src.rpm [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/ [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/ [10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com". ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> iD8DBQE+eiKhgHWT4GPEy58RAqHmAKCc3shS04jp9yf7nidbRICYwPCjlACgwD0B MS3AX0PNpAWSRzlTmGr6nDg= =6fnm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
