Trend Micro ServerProtect Multiple Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities iDefense Security Advisory 08.21.07 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ Aug 21, 2007
I. BACKGROUND Trend Micro Inc.'s ServerProtect is an anti-virus software for Microsoft Windows and Novell NetWare servers. It enables network administrators to manage multiple deployments from a single management console. For more information, please visit vendor's website at the following URL. http://us.trendmicro.com/us/products/enterprise/serverprotect-for-microsoft-windows/index.html II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in Trend Micro Inc.'s ServerProtect anti-virus software could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with system level privilege. The Trend ServerProtect service (SpntSvc.exe) handles RPC requests on TCP port 5168 with interface uuid 25288888-bd5b-11d1-9d53-0080c83a5c2c. This service utilizes the StRpcSrv.dll, Stcommon.dll, Eng50.dll and Notification.dll libraries to service various RPC requests. Three buffer overflows exist with the StRpcSrv.dll library. The first two vulnerabilities exist within the RPCFN_ENG_NewManualScan and RPCFN_ENG_TimedNewManualScan functions. These functions copy user-supplied data into a fixed-size heap buffer without performing proper bounds checking. The third problem exists within the RPCFN_SetComputerName function. This function copies user-supplied data into a fixed-size stack buffer using the MultiByteToWideChar() function without correctly specifying the output buffer length. Two stack-based buffer overflows exist within the Stcommon.dll library. These problems specifically exist within the RPCFN_CMON_SetSvcImpersonateUser and RPCFN_OldCMON_SetSvcImpersonateUser functions. These functions copy user-supplied data into a fixed-size stack buffer without performing proper bounds checking. Two buffer overflows exist within the Eng50.dll library. These two issues exist within the ENG_TakeActioinOnAFile and RPCFN_ENG_AddTaskExportLogItem functions. Both of these functions copy user-supplied data into fixed-size buffers without performing proper bounds checking. The ENG_TakeActioinOnAFile function uses a buffer stored on the heap as the destination, where as the RPCFN_ENG_AddTaskExportLogItem function uses a buffer stored in stack memory. A stack-based buffer overflow exists within the Notification.dll library. This vulnerability specifically exists in the NTF_SetPagerNotifyConfig function. This function copies user-supplied data into a fixed-size stack buffer without performing proper bounds checking. The Trend ServerProtect Agent service handles RPC requests on TCP port 3628 with interface uuid 25288888-bd5b-11d1-9d53-0080c83a5c2c. A stack-based buffer overflow has been found to exist within the RPCFN_CopyAUSrc function. This function copies user-supplied data into a fixed-size stack buffer. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with system level privilege. Exploitation requires that attackers send specially crafted RPC requests to the Trend ServerProtect or Trend ServerProtect Agent services. IV. DETECTION iDefense has confirmed the existence of these vulnerabilities in ServerProtect for Windows 5.58 Build 1176 (Security Patch 3). Previous versions, as well as versions for other platforms, are suspected to be vulnerable. V. WORKAROUND iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE Trend Micro has addressed these vulnerabilities with the release of Security Patch 4 for ServerProtect. For more information consult the release notes at the following URL. http://www.trendmicro.com/ftp/documentation/readme/spnt_558_win_en_securitypatch4_readme.txt VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2007-4218 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 06/14/2007 Initial vendor notification 06/20/2007 Initial vendor response 08/21/2007 Coordinated public disclosure IX. CREDIT These vulnerabilities were discovered by Code Audit Labs, Jun Mao (iDefense Labs), and two researchers that wish to remain anonymous. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2007 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.
