The RNG can't actually be seeded from a shell script, due to the reliance on ioctls and the fact that entropy written into the unprivileged /dev/urandom device is not immediately mixed in, making subsequent seed reads dangerous. For this reason, the seedrng project provides a basic "C script" meant to be copy and pasted into projects like Busybox and tweaked as needed: <https://git.zx2c4.com/seedrng/about/>.
The SeedRNG construction has been part of systemd's seeder since January, and recently was added to Android, OpenRC, and Void's Runit, with more integrations on their way depending on context. Virtually every single Busybox-based distro I have seen seeds things in wrong, incomplete, or otherwise dangerous way. For example, fixing this issue in Buildroot requires first for Busybox to have this fix. This commit imports it into Busybox and wires up the basic config. The utility itself is tiny, and unlike the example code from the SeedRNG project, we can re-use libbb's existing hash functions, rather than having to ship a standalone BLAKE2s, which makes this even smaller. In total this adds 2551 bytes to the binary: (add/remove: 9/0 grow/shrink: 4/0 up/down: 2551/0) text data bss dec hex filename 1050657 16499 1816 1068972 104fac busybox_old 1053295 16515 1848 1071658 105a2a busybox_unstripped Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <ja...@zx2c4.com> --- Changes v3->v4: - Hoist bb_strtoul out of min/max to prevent quadruple evaluation. - Don't use separate variables for boottime/realtime. - Make use of ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP where appropriate. - Order hash initialization after lock taking per Bernhard's taste. - Add comment description of theory of operation. - The binary is even smaller than v3. Changes v2->v3: - Make extensive use of libbb.h functions, which simplify a lot of code and reduce binary size considerably. - Use the already existing PID_FILE_PATH variable. - Compute bloatcheck for commit message. util-linux/seedrng.c | 296 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 296 insertions(+) create mode 100644 util-linux/seedrng.c diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1bceae405 --- /dev/null +++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <ja...@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. + * + * SeedRNG is a simple program made for seeding the Linux kernel random number + * generator from seed files. It is is useful in light of the fact that the + * Linux kernel RNG cannot be initialized from shell scripts, and new seeds + * cannot be safely generated from boot time shell scripts either. It should + * be run once at init time and once at shutdown time. It can be run at other + * times on a timer as well. Whenever it is run, it writes existing seed files + * into the RNG pool, and then creates a new seed file. If the RNG is + * initialized at the time of creating a new seed file, then that new seed file + * is marked as "creditable", which means it can be used to initialize the RNG. + * Otherwise, it is marked as "non-creditable", in which case it is still used + * to seed the RNG's pool, but will not initialize the RNG. In order to ensure + * that entropy only ever stays the same or increases from one seed file to the + * next, old seed values are hashed together with new seed values when writing + * new seed files. + * + * This is based on code from <https://git.zx2c4.com/seedrng/about/>. + */ + +//config:config SEEDRNG +//config: bool "seedrng (2.5 kb)" +//config: default y +//config: help +//config: Seed the kernel RNG from seed files, meant to be called +//config: once during startup, once during shutdown, and optionally +//config: at some periodic interval in between. + +//applet:IF_SEEDRNG(APPLET(seedrng, BB_DIR_USR_SBIN, BB_SUID_DROP)) + +//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_SEEDRNG) += seedrng.o + +//usage:#define seedrng_trivial_usage +//usage: "[-d SEED_DIRECTORY] [-l LOCK_FILE] [-n]" +//usage:#define seedrng_full_usage "\n\n" +//usage: "Seed the kernel RNG from seed files." +//usage: "\n" +//usage: "\n -d, --seed-dir DIR Use seed files from specified directory (default: /var/lib/seedrng)" +//usage: "\n -l, --lock-file FILE Use file as exclusive lock (default: /var/run/seedrng.lock)" +//usage: "\n -n, --skip-credit Skip crediting seeds, even if creditable" + +#include "libbb.h" + +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <sys/random.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <poll.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <endian.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +#ifndef GRND_INSECURE +#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004 /* Apparently some headers don't ship with this yet. */ +#endif + +#if ENABLE_PID_FILE_PATH +#define PID_FILE_PATH CONFIG_PID_FILE_PATH +#else +#define PID_FILE_PATH "/var/run" +#endif + +#define DEFAULT_SEED_DIR "/var/lib/seedrng" +#define DEFAULT_LOCK_FILE PID_FILE_PATH "/seedrng.lock" +#define CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.credit" +#define NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.no-credit" + +static char *seed_dir, *lock_file, *creditable_seed, *non_creditable_seed; + +enum seedrng_lengths { + MIN_SEED_LEN = SHA256_OUTSIZE, + MAX_SEED_LEN = 512 +}; + +static size_t determine_optimal_seed_len(void) +{ + char poolsize_str[11] = { 0 }; + unsigned long poolsize; + + if (open_read_close("/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize", poolsize_str, sizeof(poolsize_str) - 1) < 0) { + bb_perror_msg("unable to determine pool size, falling back to %u bits", MIN_SEED_LEN * 8); + return MIN_SEED_LEN; + } + poolsize = (bb_strtoul(poolsize_str, NULL, 10) + 7) / 8; + return MAX(MIN(poolsize, MAX_SEED_LEN), MIN_SEED_LEN); +} + +static int read_new_seed(uint8_t *seed, size_t len, bool *is_creditable) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + *is_creditable = false; + ret = getrandom(seed, len, GRND_NONBLOCK); + if (ret == (ssize_t)len) { + *is_creditable = true; + return 0; + } else if (ret < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) { + struct pollfd random_fd = { + .fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY), + .events = POLLIN + }; + if (random_fd.fd < 0) + return -1; + *is_creditable = safe_poll(&random_fd, 1, 0) == 1; + close(random_fd.fd); + } else if (getrandom(seed, len, GRND_INSECURE) == (ssize_t)len) + return 0; + if (open_read_close("/dev/urandom", seed, len) == (ssize_t)len) + return 0; + if (!errno) + errno = EIO; + return -1; +} + +static int seed_rng(uint8_t *seed, size_t len, bool credit) +{ + struct { + int entropy_count; + int buf_size; + uint8_t buffer[MAX_SEED_LEN]; + } req = { + .entropy_count = credit ? len * 8 : 0, + .buf_size = len + }; + int random_fd, ret; + + if (len > sizeof(req.buffer)) { + errno = EFBIG; + return -1; + } + memcpy(req.buffer, seed, len); + + random_fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDWR); + if (random_fd < 0) + return -1; + ret = ioctl(random_fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &req); + if (ret) + ret = -errno ? -errno : -EIO; + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) + close(random_fd); + errno = -ret; + return ret ? -1 : 0; +} + +static int seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, bool credit, sha256_ctx_t *hash) +{ + uint8_t seed[MAX_SEED_LEN]; + ssize_t seed_len; + int dfd = -1, ret = 0; + + dfd = open(seed_dir, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); + if (dfd < 0) { + ret = -errno; + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to open seed directory"); + goto out; + } + seed_len = open_read_close(filename, seed, sizeof(seed)); + if (seed_len < 0) { + if (errno != ENOENT) { + ret = -errno; + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to read seed file"); + } + goto out; + } + if ((unlink(filename) < 0 || fsync(dfd) < 0) && seed_len) { + ret = -errno; + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to remove seed after reading, so not seeding"); + goto out; + } + if (!seed_len) + goto out; + + sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len)); + sha256_hash(hash, seed, seed_len); + + printf("Seeding %zd bits %s crediting\n", seed_len * 8, credit ? "and" : "without"); + ret = seed_rng(seed, seed_len, credit); + if (ret < 0) + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to seed"); +out: + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && dfd >= 0) + close(dfd); + errno = -ret; + return ret ? -1 : 0; +} + +int seedrng_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; +int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[]) +{ + static const char seedrng_prefix[] = "SeedRNG v1 Old+New Prefix"; + static const char seedrng_failure[] = "SeedRNG v1 No New Seed Failure"; + int ret, fd = -1, lock, program_ret = 0; + uint8_t new_seed[MAX_SEED_LEN]; + size_t new_seed_len; + bool new_seed_creditable; + bool skip_credit = false; + struct timespec timestamp = { 0 }; + sha256_ctx_t hash; + + int opt; + enum { + OPT_d = (1 << 0), + OPT_l = (1 << 1), + OPT_n = (1 << 2) + }; +#if ENABLE_LONG_OPTS + static const char longopts[] ALIGN1 = + "seed-dir\0" Required_argument "d" + "lock-file\0" Required_argument "l" + "skip-credit\0" No_argument "n" + ; +#endif + + opt = getopt32long(argv, "d:l:n", longopts, &seed_dir, &lock_file); + if (!(opt & OPT_d) || !seed_dir) + seed_dir = xstrdup(DEFAULT_SEED_DIR); + if (!(opt & OPT_l) || !lock_file) + lock_file = xstrdup(DEFAULT_LOCK_FILE); + skip_credit = opt & OPT_n; + creditable_seed = concat_path_file(seed_dir, CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME); + non_creditable_seed = concat_path_file(seed_dir, NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME); + + umask(0077); + if (getuid()) + bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("this program requires root"); + + if (mkdir(seed_dir, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) + bb_simple_perror_msg_and_die("unable to create seed directory"); + + lock = open(lock_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0000); + if (lock < 0 || flock(lock, LOCK_EX) < 0) { + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to open lock file"); + program_ret = 1; + goto out; + } + + sha256_begin(&hash); + sha256_hash(&hash, seedrng_prefix, strlen(seedrng_prefix)); + clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ×tamp); + sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp)); + clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×tamp); + sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp)); + + ret = seed_from_file_if_exists(non_creditable_seed, false, &hash); + if (ret < 0) + program_ret |= 1 << 1; + ret = seed_from_file_if_exists(creditable_seed, !skip_credit, &hash); + if (ret < 0) + program_ret |= 1 << 2; + + new_seed_len = determine_optimal_seed_len(); + ret = read_new_seed(new_seed, new_seed_len, &new_seed_creditable); + if (ret < 0) { + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to read new seed"); + new_seed_len = SHA256_OUTSIZE; + strncpy((char *)new_seed, seedrng_failure, new_seed_len); + program_ret |= 1 << 3; + } + sha256_hash(&hash, &new_seed_len, sizeof(new_seed_len)); + sha256_hash(&hash, new_seed, new_seed_len); + sha256_end(&hash, new_seed + new_seed_len - SHA256_OUTSIZE); + + printf("Saving %zu bits of %s seed for next boot\n", new_seed_len * 8, new_seed_creditable ? "creditable" : "non-creditable"); + fd = open(non_creditable_seed, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0400); + if (fd < 0) { + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to open seed file for writing"); + program_ret |= 1 << 4; + goto out; + } + if (write(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len) != (ssize_t)new_seed_len || fsync(fd) < 0) { + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to write seed file"); + program_ret |= 1 << 5; + goto out; + } + if (new_seed_creditable && rename(non_creditable_seed, creditable_seed) < 0) { + bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to make new seed creditable"); + program_ret |= 1 << 6; + } +out: + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && fd >= 0) + close(fd); + if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && lock >= 0) + close(lock); + return program_ret; +} -- 2.35.1 _______________________________________________ busybox mailing list busybox@busybox.net http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/busybox
