Here's a good roundup from Strategy Page on why the US military is able to kill 
their enemies so effectively while taking historically low causalities.






Why 21st CenturyWarfare Is Different


August 14, 2011: After ten years of fighting, the war on terrorhas caused 
51,600 American military casualties (6,200 dead and 45,400 wounded).This 
includes a small number of CIA, State Department and other agencypersonnel. 
Over 99 percent are Department of Defense. Not all the casualtieswere from 
combat, with 21 percent of the deaths from non-combat causes. InWorld War II 
that was 25 percent. Iraq fighting accounted for 71 percent of thedeaths and 70 
percent of the wounded. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq,operations in dozens of 
other countries represented 2.5 percent of deaths, butabout 71 percent of these 
were from non-combat causes. 






The first 21stcentury war was quite different than the 20th century conflicts. 
For one thing,far fewer Americans are being killed or wounded in combat. And 
fewer and fewerof those who are wounded die. It’s a continuing trend. Last 
year, eight percentof the wounded died, compared to eleven percent in 2009. 
There are severalreasons for more troops surviving battle wounds (and injuries 
from accidents).An obvious cause is body armor. Improvements over the past 
decade, in terms ofdesign and bullet resistance, account for about 20 percent 
of the decline incasualties. There's a down side to this, as the body armor is 
heavier andcumbersome. This reduces a soldier's mobility, and increases 
casualties a bit(and saves some enemy lives as well.) 






Another majorfactor is medical care, which has gotten much better, quicker and 
faster. Notonly are procedures more effective, but badly wounded soldiers get 
to theoperating table more quickly. Medics now have capabilities that, 
duringVietnam, only surgeons possessed. Movement of casualties to an operating 
roomis much faster now, partly because of better transportation, but also 
becauseof more efficient methods, and operating rooms that are placed closer to 
thebattlefield. 






Another majorfactor is the change in what caused casualties. Explosions (like 
roadsidebombs) are less likely to cause fatal wounds. For example, currently 
12.9percent of bullet wounds are fatal, compared to 7.3 percent for bombs and 
3.5percent for RPGs (and grenades in general). The enemy in Afghanistan prefers 
touse roadside bombs, because U.S. troops are much superior in a gun battle. 
Allthis contributed to the changing the ratio of wounded-to-killed, that 
was6-to-1 in Vietnam, to 10-1 now.
In Iraq andAfghanistan, there has also been a dramatic reduction in combat 
deaths comparedto Vietnam, and previous 20th century wars. The death rate 
(adjusting for thenumber of troops involved) in Iraq was a third of what it was 
in Vietnam. It'seven lower in Afghanistan. There was such a massive reduction 
in combat deaths thatthe percentage of deaths that were from non-combat causes 
actually went up. Forexample, there were 47,359 (81.4 percent) combat deaths in 
Vietnam, and 10,797(18.6 percent) from non-combat causes. In Iraq it is 80 
percent and 20 percent.In Afghanistan it is 70 percent and 30 percent. The 
ratio of dead to wounded isalso different in Iraq (1 dead for 7.2 wounded) 
compared to Afghanistan (1 deadfor 8.1 wounded)
There are alsodifferences in the types of casualties. For example, in Vietnam, 
bullets caused38 percent of the deaths. In Iraq, it was only 19 percent, and 27 
percent inAfghanistan. The Iraqis are notoriously bad shots, even though the 
urban battlespace in Iraq was very similar to Vietnam. There is more of a 
tradition ofmarksmanship in Afghanistan, despite (or probably because of) the 
frequentlylonger distances involved. The superior body armor has made life much 
harderfor enemy marksmen, as chest shots are now frequently useless and fatal 
headshots are very difficult.






In Vietnam,15.7 percent of U.S. combat deaths were caused by IEDs (Improvised 
ExplosiveDevices), while in Iraq and Afghanistan it peaked at about 60 percent, 
and thendeclined. Casualties were avoided, or made less severe with the 
development ofspecial armored vehicles (MRAPs) that reduced the impact of the 
explosives. Theroadside bomb is a much less effective weapon, a loser's weapon, 
because itkills more civilians than enemy troops and played a major role in 
turning thelocals against the Iraqi terrorists and Afghan Taliban.






Aircraftrelated deaths (from crashes) were 14.6 percent of the combat 
fatalities inVietnam, while it was only a few percent in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The currenthelicopters were built with Vietnam experience in mind, and are more 
resistantto damage and safer to crash land in. Ground vehicle related deaths 
were twopercent in Vietnam, but more than double that in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Most ofthe ground vehicle deaths were non-combat related. That's because from 
WorldWar II to the present, the U.S. armed forces put huge numbers of trucks 
andother vehicles on roads (often poorly maintained, or shot up), at all hours, 
inall weather and with drivers fighting fatigue. There being a war on, 
thevehicles often proceeded at unsafe speeds.






What made the experienceso different today, versus past wars? It was a 
combination of things. The mostimportant difference is that the troops in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are fightingsmarter. While the Vietnam era troops were 
representative of the generalpopulation, the post-Vietnam era army is 
all-volunteer and highly selective.The troops are smarter, healthier and better 
educated than the generalpopulation. During the last three decades, new 
attitudes have developedthroughout the army (which always got most of the 
draftees). The army, so tospeak, has become more like the marines (which was 
always all-volunteer, andmore innovative as a result). This ability to quickly 
analyze and adapt getsrecognized by military historians, and other armies, but 
not by the media. Italso saves lives in combat.






Thisinnovation has led to better training, tactics and leadership. Smarter 
troopsmeans smarter and more capable leaders, from the sergeants leading fire 
terms(five men) to the generals running the whole show. Smarter troops leads 
totactics constantly adapting to changes on the battlefield. The better 
tactics,and smarter fighting, has been the biggest reason for the lower death 
rate.
Better weaponsand equipment have made U.S. troops less vulnerable to attack. 
GPS guided weaponshave made the biggest difference. There are now GPS guided 
bombs, shells androckets. This enables troops to hit a target with the first 
shot, and be closerto the explosion (the better to move right in and take care 
of armed enemysurvivors). Another benefit is much fewer civilian casualties. In 
both Iraq andVietnam, the enemy frequently used civilians as human shields, and 
the bettertrained American troops were able to cope with this in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 








And then therewas night vision gear. This first appeared during Vietnam, but in 
four decades,the stuff has gotten better, lighter and cheaper. Every soldier 
has nightvision now, as do most combat vehicles. There are also better radios, 
betteruniforms, even better field rations. It all made a difference.






Then there wasthe Internet, which enabled the troops to get in touch with each 
other. Thismade a big difference. Not just for the grunts, but also for the 
NCOs andofficers. Each community had different problems and solutions. With the 
Internet,they could easily discuss the problems, and quickly share the 
solutions. Thetroops did this by themselves, and it was up to the military to 
play catch up.Life-saving tips are passed around with unprecedented speed. This 
made a majordifference in combat, where better tactics and techniques save 
lives.






Computers andvideo games had an impact as well. The draft ended about the same 
time thatpersonal computers and video games began to show up. So there have 
been threedecades of troops who grew up with both. It was the troops who led 
the effortto computerize many military activities, and video games evolved into 
highlyrealistic training simulators. The automation eliminated a lot of drudge 
work,while the simulators got troops up to speed before they hit the combat 
zone.Computers also made possible doing things with information, especially 
aboutthe enemy, that was not possible before. A lot of troops understand 
operationsresearch and statistical analysis, and they use it to good effect. 
Research hasalso shown that heavy use of video games trains the user to make 
decisionsfaster. That's a lifesaver in combat. 






UAVs andTrackers took a lot of the fog out of war. For nearly a century, the 
troops onthe ground depended on someone in an airplane or helicopter to help 
them sortout who was where. In the last decade, the guy in the air has been 
replaced byrobots. UAVs, especially the hand held ones every infantry company 
has, nowgive the ground commander his own recon aircraft. He controls it, and 
it worksonly for him. Combat commanders now have a top-down view of his troops, 
and theenemy. This has made a huge difference, creating some fundamental 
changes inthe way captains and colonels command their troops. For higher 
commanders, theGPS transponders carried by most combat vehicles, provides a 
tracking systemthat shows a real-time picture, on a laptop screen, of where all 
your troopsare. This takes a lot of uncertainty out of command.






Livingconditions enabled troops in combat to be more alert and effective. 
Somecivilians think air-conditioned sleeping quarters for combat troops, and 
lotsof other goodies in base camps, is indulgent. It is anything but. Getting 
agood night's sleep can be a life-saver for combat soldiers, and AC makes 
thatpossible. Showers, Internet links to home and good chow do wonders for 
morale,especially for guys getting shot at every day. Good morale means a more 
alert,and capable, soldier. The combat units often go weeks, or months, without 
theseamenities, but the knowledge that these goodies are there, and eventually 
to beenjoyed, takes some of the sting out of all the combat stress. The rate 
ofcombat fatigue in Iraq has been much lower than in Vietnam, or any 
previouswar.






The enemy inIraq and Afghanistan was not as effective as the Vietnamese were. 
The Talibanare more effective than the Iraqis, but not by much. All this is 
partly this isdue to cultural factors, partly because in Vietnam, the North 
Vietnamese weresending trained soldiers south. The North Vietnamese also had 
commandos("sappers"), who, while small in number, caused a lot of anxiety, 
andcasualties, among U.S. troops. The irregular (Viet Cong) troops in 
SouthVietnam, where largely gone after 1968 (as a result of the failed 
TetOffensive), but even these fighters tended to be more deadly than the 
averageIraqi gunman or Afghan warrior. The Iraqi troops have had a dismal 
reputationfor a long time, but they can still be deadly. Just not as deadly as 
theirVietnamese counterparts. The lower fighting capability of the Iraqis saved 
lotsof American lives, but got far more Iraqis (including civilians) killed. 
TheAfghans have a more fearsome reputation, but in practice they are no match 
forprofessional infantry. And conventional wisdom to the contrary, they have 
beenbeaten many times in the past. They are blessed, after a fashion, to live 
inthe place that is not worth conquering. So whoever defeats them, soon leaves.






Finally, thereis the data advantage. The military (especially the army, which 
has collected,since Vietnam, massive amounts of information on how each soldier 
died) hasdetailed records of soldier and marine casualties. The army, in 
particular,collects and analyzes this data, and then passes on to the troops 
new tacticsand techniques derived from this analysis. The army restricts access 
to thedata, as it can provide the enemy with useful information on how 
effective theyare. Some basic data is made public, but the details will be a 
locked up fordecade or more. Studying this data is a full time job for many 
people in themilitary, and there is a constant stream of suggestions resulting 
from thisanalysis, and those suggestions often turn into yet another small 
decline incombat deaths.










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