Warren Kumari <war...@kumari.net> wrote: > Currently, network providers use a number of interception techniques > to reach a human user (such as intercepting cleartext HTTP to force a > redirect to a web page of their choice), many of which look like a MitM > attack.
I think this is too weak. I would say: Currently, network providers use a number of interception techniques to reach a human user. Technically, most of the mechanisms are Man-in-The-Middle Attacks against DNS or HTTP. This has the effect of redirecting all HTTP traffic to a web page of their choice, even for requests which are not viewed by a human. It often also results in permanent DNS cache poisoning. As endpoints become inherently more secure specifically through DNSSEC, and HTTPS-everywhere, existing interception techniques not only fail to reach a human, but usually result in a the user and the device being confused: their either give up, or complain loudly that the network is broken (which technically, it is). In the cases where the technique does reach a human, it often results in a security warning about a broken certificate, and the resulting technique is therefore training users to ignore those warnings. === I find your list of deliverables perfect. I think that this effort could benefit from some significant outreach by ISOC (and perhaps the IAOC meeting people could involve their contacts): we need to reach the hotel managers. -- Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
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