no hats... On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, at 06:14, David Bird wrote: > I, for one, think "Document that the signaling protocol does not provide > mechanisms for non-binary blocking." is where IETF tries to become a some > sort of legal authority...
The IETF describes what consenting protocol participants can do. So, I'm fairly sure that legal authority has no bearing on this. However, your point remains a good one. There are relatively few places where you will find that blocking a per-destination basis doesn't happen at all. No two networks are the same, and many apply policies that affect how your packets are passed. Maybe it's a shortcoming in the draft, but recognizing that the intent is to provide an indication of whether access meets common expectations for network access should help. > At this point, I think you might as well remove the entire signaling > section... It reads like propaganda against signaling as a concept.. then > later has a entire section on the Nuisance factor of signaling, where it is > suggested "it may be possible for any user on the Internet to send > signals"... Hmm.. Personally, I'm comfortable with what is there as a set of requirements. They aren't that negatively phrased, just narrowly scoped. I think that a more narrowly targeted version of your ICMP draft would have met these requirements, as would several of the other things we've considered. I might concede - as some have argued - that the resulting value is so greatly diminished as to not make it worthwhile, but that's the essence of the debate. > The section titled "Risk of Nuisance Captive Portal" should really be > talking about networks that USE the API and have NO network integration > (e.g. Captive by API only, not by any network enforcement function). Opened https://github.com/capport-wg/architecture/issues/24 Thanks, Martin _______________________________________________ Captive-portals mailing list Captive-portals@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/captive-portals
