Martin Thomson <m...@lowentropy.net> wrote:
    >> I'd rather we didn't allow for iPAddress SANs, but it's not a sword I'll 
die on.

    > Ack.  Personally, I'm more concerned about implementations allowing an
    > override option other than through modifying the trust store.  A domain
    > name is equally problematic there (let's hope we don't see .home
    > addresses...).  But I don't see any easy path to a per-host override
    > based on what I've seen in implementations so far.

Again, some enterprise PHB will point to this paragraph and tell the techie
that s/he doesn't need to do things the right way.  I've been there.
So I would like to know why we added it.  We can specify a subset of RFC6125.

    >> The next part says:
    >> An Enforcement Device SHOULD allow access to any
    >> services that User Equipment could need to contact to perform
    >> certificate validation, such as OCSP responders, CRLs, and NTP
    >> servers;
    >>
    >> That's a good list, and that list can be seen from looking at the
    >> certificates that the captive portal operator is going to use.
    >> But, aren't there *also* systems (Mozilla? Chrome?) where the respective
    >> vendors are collecting that info into a central place to make stuff go
    >> faster?   I can't quite find what I'm looking for in a search, because
    >> OCSP-Stapling is not what I'm talking about, and eliminates the need.

    > Yes, browsers are providing systems that help with revocation.  Mozilla
    > has OneCRL and CRLite; Chrome has CRLSets; offhand, I don't know what
    > Microsoft and Apple might be doing differently.  Those systems that I'm
    > aware of don't require network access at validation time.  The whole
    > point being to provide timely information about revocation without
    > depending on a live OCSP or CRL fetch (which have poor privacy
    > properties in addition to adding to fragility).

Ah, okay.  The CRL is "built-in", so it does not need to be fetched while in
captivity. Thank you.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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