On 05/29/2017 10:18 AM, Leon Fauster wrote:
Am 29.05.2017 um 14:41 schrieb Robert Moskowitz <r...@htt-consult.com>:
On 05/29/2017 06:46 AM, Leon Fauster wrote:
Am 29.05.2017 um 05:46 schrieb Robert Moskowitz <r...@htt-consult.com>:
On 05/28/2017 06:57 PM, Rob Kampen wrote:
On 28/05/17 23:56, Leon Fauster wrote:
so there are mitigations - the question really is: why hasn't redhat made these
mitigations the default for their enterprise products - maybe other influences
we are unaware of - seems like a huge big hole. With the advent of SSL/TLS
being mandated by google et al, every device needs access to entropy.
The challenge is this is so system dependent. Some are just fine with stock
install. Others need rng-tools. Still others need haveged. If Redhat were to
do anything, it would be to stop making the default cert during firstboot.
Rather spin off a one-time process that would wait until there was enough
entropy and then create the default cert. Thing is I can come up with
situations were that can go wrong.
There are a lot of best practices with certificates and crypto that are not
apparent to most admins. I know some things for the crypto work I do (I am the
author of the HIP protocol in the IETF). There is just not one size fits all
here, and people need to collect clues along with random entropy....
This default cert is not valid anyway and as random source they use:
Not valid in what way? Yes the Subject and Issuer names are dorkie, but how
are they not valid?
Not valid in terms of validation (PKI), not equal with verification in terms of "it
works".
Oh, and in my 8 years with Verizon, I worked with the Cybertrust PKI
team. And I am the author of the Bridge CA model used in the US Fed
PKI, the BioPharm PKI and a few others.
I despair about what it costs to do decent Identity management. And how
meaningless much of it still is.
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