On Thu, 2010-09-23 at 20:15 +0200, Martin Rex wrote: > Marsh Ray wrote: > > It's not possible for a network security protocol to survive the > > compromise of one of the endpoints. We can no longer reason about Alice > > and Bob if Bob is allowed to be under the hypnotic control of Eve. > > True. I used the wrong words in what I was trying to say. > > There is definitely little that you can do about a full compromise of > the real server. > > But blindly trusting browsers may easily turn seemingly small security > vulnerability (every XSS, CSRF, content upload), that enables diverting > a victim to the attackers own server seamlessly, close to equivalent to > a full compromise of the real server for the purpose of capturing > sensible or confidential information from the victim.
This is the design of the browser. Trying to prevent it in server-id-check (of all places) makes no design sense and would cause many more problems than it solves. -- Matt _______________________________________________ certid mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/certid
