Hello Ana, CSI'ers, I think I disagree with the paragraph of the draft copied below my note.
To me it seems OK to specify that SEND should use the same hash function than CGA. Since they are used together to provide security, and since the security of the resulting system can't be stronger than the weakest of its components, the maximum level of security can be reached by choosing mechanisms (hash functions in this case) with similar security strength for both CGA and SEND. Improving the security level of only one of the component would not increase the overall security of the system. Has anybody an opinion on the topic? --julien > 4. Support for the hash agility in SeND > > While all of analyzed hash functions in SeND are theoretically > affected by recent collision attacks, these attacks indicate the > possibility of future real-world attacks. In order to increase > the future security of SeND, we suggest the support for the hash and > algorithm agility in SeND. > > The most effective and secure would be to bind the hash function > option with something that can not be changed at all, like > [rfc4982] does for CGA - encoding the hash function information into > addresses. But, there is no possibilty to do that in SeND. We could > decide to use by default the same hash function in SeND as in CGA, > but this solution is architecturally strange and it does not really > increase the security since the difficulty for attackers remain to > break one single hash function. Furthermore, it may even reduce the > security level by providing more relevant information of the hash > function. On the other side, the use of two different hash algorithms > makes attacker's life harder. > > Another solution is to incorporate the hash function option into > SeND message. By putting a new hash function option in SeND message > before RSA Signature option, attacker will have to break both the > signature and the hash input at the same time since the new option > will be input field for the Digital Signature in RSA Signature > option. However, we can not avoid a downgrade attack totally because > peer might be using just ND and not SeND. A completely safe solution > here does not exist. A new hash function option in SeND message is a > reasonable and the best solution for the hash algorithm agility > support in SeND. > > Each implementation SHOULD use different hash or signature > algorithms for each of the relevant fields (Key Hash field, Digital > Signature, PKIX signature algorithm). Since all algorithms are in > different procedures, making them the same does not make those > procedures simpler, but making them different complicates possible > attacks. On Tuesday 01 July 2008, Ana Kukec wrote: > The new version of draft-kukec-csi-hash-threat is submitted. Comments > are welcome! > > Filename: draft-kukec-csi-hash-threat > Revision: 02 > Title: SeND Hash Threat Analysis > Creation_date: 2008-07-01 > WG ID: Independent Submission > Number_of_pages: 15 > > Abstract: > This document analysis the use of hashes in SeND, possible threats > and the impact of recent attacks on hash functions used by SeND. > Current SeND specification [rfc3971] uses SHA-1 [sha-1] hash > algorithm and PKIX certificates [rfc3280] and does not provide > support for the hash algorithm agility. Based on previous analysis, > this document suggests multiple hash support that should be included > in the SeND update specification. > > > Ana > > _______________________________________________ > CGA-EXT mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext _______________________________________________ CGA-EXT mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cga-ext
