Hi,

I have read this document and i have some questions.

In the introduction you state:

 The secure neighbor discovery usage scenarios have recently been
  extended to include environments with mobile or nomadic nodes.  These
  nodes can often be limited in power and memory capabilities, and thus
  may only be able to support lightweight public key cryptography; that
  is, RSA-based public keys and algorithm support may not be feasible.

But the proposed solution still requires to have an RSA key in the Public Key field of the CGA PDS, right?

So, i am confused about how the goal of not having RAS keys is achieved with this apporach

next:

 The secure neighbor discovery usage scenarios have recently been
  extended to include environments with mobile or nomadic nodes.  These
  nodes can often be limited in power and memory capabilities, and thus
  may only be able to support lightweight public key cryptography; that
  is, RSA-based public keys and algorithm support may not be feasible.

i am not sure this belongs to this doc or to the send one


then it reads:

  However , it should be noted that the resulting security level of a
  multiple-key CGA is only that of the weakest key.  Therefore, the
  requirement remains that every key in use should have a security
  level matching or exceeding that of a 384-bit RSA key.


I am not sure this is true
I mean, this depends on how the receiving node is implemented, right? I mean, if the receiver only acceptes keys with a given length, then it won't accept signatures with other shorter keys, even if the keys are part of the CGA.

Regards, marcelo



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